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Free Expression, In-Group Bias, and the
Court’s Conservatives: A Critique of the
Epstein-Parker-Segal Study
TODD E. PETTYS†
INTRODUCTION
On May 6, 2014, the New York Times reported on a new
study1 conducted by three prominent political scientists—
Professors Lee Epstein, Jeffrey Segal, and Christopher
Parker—concerning Supreme Court justices’ voting patterns
in First Amendment free-expression cases.2 After analyzing
all such cases decided between the Court’s 1953 and 2010
terms, the study’s authors determined that there is evidence
of pervasive in-group bias on the Court, with “the justices’
votes tend[ing] to reflect their preferences toward the

† H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation, University of Iowa College
of Law. Many thanks to Sheila Barron, Stephanos Bibas, Arthur Bonfield, Mary
Campbell, Andy Grewal, Tim Hagle, Anna Harvey, Steve Hitlin, Herb
Hovenkamp, David Hyman, Mark Osiel, Eric Posner, Jennifer Puryear, Michael
Saks, Carolyn Shapiro, and Caroline Sheerin for either reading drafts or talking
with me about portions of this Article.
1. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices
Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment (on file with author), available at http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/InGroupBias.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). The authors presented the
study at the 2013 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
See id. at n.*.
2. See Adam Liptak, For Justices, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree
With’, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2014, at A15.
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speakers’ ideological grouping.”3 The authors found that the
justices are more likely to support speakers’ legal claims
when the expression at issue “conforms to [the justices’ own]
values”4 and “are much less apt to protect expression rights
when the expresser is from the opposing ideological team.”5
The authors also reported that the members of the
Roberts Court are not equal ideological offenders. The four
current justices who proved most likely to vote in favor of
ideologically likeminded speakers during the study’s time
period, the authors told the New York Times, are the Court’s
most conservative members: Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.6 The authors supported
that indictment with a chart,7 listing all Roberts Court
justices (current and former) in order from most conservative
to most liberal, excluding the Court’s two most recent
appointees (Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) on the grounds
that those justices had not yet cast votes in a statistically
meaningful number of free-expression cases.8 The authors
3. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2. Using the Supreme Court Database, the
authors identified 516 cases that fell within the study’s time parameters. See id.
at 7; see generally About, SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/
about.php (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
4. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3.
5. Id. at 16.
6. See Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices
Defend the Speech They Hate? 4 (May 2, 2014) [hereinafter Summary] (on file with
author), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasSummary.pdf; see also
Lee Epstein: Research, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/
InGroupBias.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (stating that the document was
“prepared for the New York Times”). Liberal justices did not emerge from the
study unscathed. Among past justices, for example, Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, and Warren all were found to have statistically significant disparities in
their support for conservative and liberal speakers. See Summary, supra, at 7.
7. Summary, supra note 6, at 5.
8. Id. at 4-5. The authors placed the justices along the conservative-liberal
spectrum by assigning them Segal-Cover scores. See Epstein et al., supra note 1,
at 8; see also Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes
of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559-63 (1989)
(proposing that justices’ ideological values be ascertained by analyzing preconfirmation newspaper editorials in left-leaning and right-leaning national
newspapers); see generally LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY
OF RATIONAL CHOICE 73-74 (2013) [hereinafter EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF
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used an asterisk to indicate those justices for whom the
difference in support for conservative and liberal speakers
was statistically significant. The resulting array follows:
Justice

Thomas*
Scalia*
Alito*
Roberts*
Kennedy*
O’Connor*
Breyer
Souter
Ginsburg
Stevens*

% Support for Free Expression Claim
Liberal
Speaker/Speech
23.1
20.7
9.1
15.4
43.2
30.6
40.0
60.3
53.2
62.8

Number
of Votes

Conservative
Speaker/Speech
65.4
65.2
53.9
64.3
67.7
50.7
38.1
51.1
40.0
46.9

104
161
24
27
143
190
87
103
92
260

Table A: The Authors’ Report on the Roberts Court Justices

The authors’ findings—particularly those concerning the
Court’s conservatives—received wide attention in the press
and in the blogosphere. Adam Liptak opened his coverage for
the New York Times by using the study to debunk the notion
that Justice Scalia is “a consistent and principled defender of
free speech rights,” writing that “Justice Scalia voted to
uphold the free speech rights of conservative speakers at
more than triple the rate of liberal ones.”9 Salon covered the
study under the title Scalia’s Free Speech Hypocrisy: What a
New Study Proves About His Bias.10 A writer for The
Economist used the study to condemn ideologically motivated
FEDERAL JUDGES] (briefly discussing the strengths and weaknesses of relying
upon Segal-Cover scores for such purposes).
9. Liptak, supra note 2.
10. Elias Isquith, Scalia’s Free Speech Hypocrisy: What a New Study Proves
About His Bias, SALON (May 15, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/05/
15/scalias_free_speech_hypocrisy_what_a_new_study_proves_about_his_bias.
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voting by conservative and liberal justices alike, but
emphasized that “the Supreme Court’s current liberal and
conservative wings are not—not remotely—equally
implicated in the shady free-speech-for-my-friends racket,”
because “the righties on today’s court appear to be
significantly guiltier of in-group bias than are their liberal
colleagues.”11 Under the headline Conservative Court’s Free
Speech Rulings Drenched in Biases, a writer for the website
Common Dreams said the study shows that “conservative
members of the court are tied much tighter to their own
political and ideological biases than the liberal justices when
it comes to ruling on cases concerning free speech.”12 One
blogger said the study demonstrates that “[t]he in-group bias
of the conservative justices is far more prevalent and they are
much more likely to support only speech that they agree
with.”13 Another declared that the study provides “yet
another example of how the Supreme Court has become
rigged to favor conservatives.”14 Many of these writers’
readers presumably saw things the same way.
The story here has as much to do with those who write
and read about the Court as it does with those who serve on
it. The study’s conclusions are stunning—particularly the
uniformity of those conclusions regarding the Court’s current
conservatives—because they appear to strike a devastating
blow to the Court’s integrity as an institution that claims
fidelity to the rule of law. Given those profound implications,
the credulity with which some have uncritically accepted all
of the study’s results at face value is remarkable. One
11. S.M., Playing Favourites, THE ECONOMIST (May 13, 2014, 4:25 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/judicial-bias.
12. Jon Queally, Conservative Court’s Free Speech Rulings Drenched in Biases,
COMMON DREAMS (May 6, 2014), https://www.commondreams.org/headline/
2014/05/06-0.
13. Ed Brayton, Conservative Justices Far More Biased on Free Speech,
FREETHOUGHT BLOGS (May 7, 2014), http://freethoughtblogs.com/dispatches/2014/
05/07/conservative-justices-far-more-biased-on-free-speech.
14. David Badash, Report Proves Scalia Most Likely to Side with Conservative
Speakers in Free Speech Cases, THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (May 6, 2014),
http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/1-report-proves-scalia-most-likely-to-side
-with-conservative-speakers-in-free-speech-cases/discrimination/2014/05/06/868
24.
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wonders whether those who speedily embraced the study
would have been as quick to do so if the Court’s current
liberals had uniformly been the ones coming out looking the
worst. As I will explain,15 the very same in-group biases that
the study’s authors attribute to the justices can make
laypeople and scholars alike particularly credulous when
presented with arguments that categorically cast their
ideological opponents in an unflattering light.
The ease with which many have accepted the study’s
blanket critique of today’s conservative justices would be of
no consequence if that critique could readily withstand a
more patient review. Based upon an analysis of the authors’
evidence against Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito,
however, my judgment is that it cannot.16 The accuracy of at
least some of the authors’ findings is undercut by a mixture
of coding errors, superficial case readings, and questionable
classifications of many speakers’ ideological affiliations.
Those defects influenced the themes that emerged in the
press’s and public’s consumption of the authors’ conclusions.
I begin in Part I.A by briefly explaining the phenomenon
of in-group bias. Then, in Part I.B, I describe the means by
which Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal said they
determined speakers’ ideological identities in each of the
cases within their study. In Part I.C, I introduce readers to
the possibility that something is amiss by discussing
problems in the authors’ handling of the Court’s 2008 ruling
in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican
Party.17

15. See infra Part IV.
16. For a similarly skeptical critique of the study, see Eugene Volokh, The
Justices, the Freedom of Speech, and Ideology, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 13,
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/13/
the-justices-the-freedom-of-speech-and-ideology (concluding that the study “does
not, I think, support its conclusion, precisely because it classifies speakers as
‘liberal speakers’ or ‘conservative speakers’ for reasons other than the ‘ideological
grouping’ of the speaker or the speech”). If anything, Volokh argues, the study
simply supports the comparatively unremarkable conclusion that “[c]onservative
Justices tend to be persuaded by conservative arguments (not necessarily
conservative speakers’ arguments) for why a law should be upheld (or struck
down), and likewise for liberal Justices.” Id.
17. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).

6

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

In Part II, I identify many instances in which the authors
either coded cases improperly or made readily debatable
judgments about speakers’ ideological affiliations. Drawing
upon Part II’s discussion of cases and coding decisions, I turn
in Part III to the authors’ appraisal of the free-expression
votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—two
conservatives whose comparatively slim records are readily
susceptible to a comprehensive reassessment. The evidence
of in-group bias in those two justices’ chambers is far weaker
than the authors reported. The evidence of bias in Justice
Alito’s chambers might actually be non-existent, while—
depending on what one makes of his votes in campaignfinance cases—the evidence of bias in Chief Justice Roberts’s
chambers might rest upon just a vote or two in a tiny data
pool.
In Part IV, I invoke the literature on motivated reasoning
and in-group bias to explain why some might be willing to
quickly embrace a study that yields a uniformly damning
report on the Court’s currently sitting conservatives. I
conclude in Part V by arguing for greater rigor in empirical
analyses of the justices’ ideological voting patterns; by
suggesting that the problems with this particular study raise
important concerns regarding the publicly available
Supreme Court Database, the data-handling norms that
generally prevail among those who do empirical work of this
sort, or both; and by discussing the chief challenge that needs
to be resolved before launching future large-scale studies of
the justices’ tendency toward ideological in-group bias. I close
by briefly commenting on the authors’ problem-compounding
response to this Article’s critique of their study.
I. THE EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL STUDY
Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal aimed to break
new ground, examining for the first time the influence that
in-group biases might wield when Supreme Court justices
cast votes in the cases that come before them. The authors
chose to focus their inquiry on First Amendment freeexpression cases—that is, cases involving the freedoms of
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speech, press, assembly, and association.18 For each of the
cases that fell within the time parameters of their study, the
authors had to confirm that the dispute did indeed concern
the First Amendment, they had to determine the ideological
affiliations of the speakers or their speech,19 and they had to
determine how each of the then-sitting justices voted. Each
of those tasks—particularly the second—proved problematic.
A. In-Group Bias
As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal explain, ingroup bias is the tendency to favor those who belong to one’s
own group and to disfavor those who do not.20 Researchers
have located this tendency both when the groups play
meaningful roles in people’s lives (such as claiming one
country rather than another as one’s own)21 and when the
groups are manufactured by researchers on entirely random
grounds (such as dividing people with the toss of a coin).22
Even in the latter instances, when the criteria for
determining group membership have no relation to otherwise
meaningful similarities or differences, researchers find that
individuals behaviorally and attitudinally favor those they
regard as their own.23 Scholars have advanced a number of
18. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.6. Although the authors did not say
so, they also included at least one case involving the freedom of petition. See infra
notes 111-18, 222-28 and accompanying text (discussing the authors’ problematic
handling of Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)); see generally
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”).
19. The authors did not explain how they would handle a case in which a liberal
speaker produced conservative speech, or vice versa. See infra Part II.E.
20. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1.
21. See HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES: STUDIES IN
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 187-90 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1981) (discussing
experiments with children from several different countries).
22. See id. at 234.
23. See, e.g., Yan Chen & Sherry Xin Li, Group Identity and Social Preferences,
99 AM. ECON. REV. 431, 448 (2009); see also Miles Hewstone et al., Intergroup
Bias, 53 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 575, 576 (2002) (“Bias can encompass behavior
(discrimination), attitude (prejudice), and cognition (stereotyping).”). Tolerance of
in-group members is not, however, unlimited. See Scott Eidelman & Monica
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theories to explain this feature of our social lives.24 Some
theorists posit, for example, that favoring in-groups and
disfavoring out-groups are means by which we try to enhance
our own prestige and self-esteem.25 Others argue that
identifying strongly with one group and rejecting
identification with another can help reduce one’s
uncertainties about how to behave in the world at large.26
Whatever its causes, the phenomenon is unquestionably real.
As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal write, “[o]f all the
manifestations of social identity, in-group bias (or favoritism)
may be among the most central—and best documented.”27
In one of many laboratory studies, for example,
researchers gave test subjects a set of lottery tickets and
asked them to divide the tickets between themselves and an
anonymous individual.28 In one variation, subjects were told
that the unknown individual was a registered Democrat and
in another they were told that the would-be recipient was a
registered Republican. The researchers found that
Democrats and Republicans alike were more generous with
individuals they believed to be members of their own political
party. The stronger the subject’s own self-identification as a
Biernat, Derogating Black Sheep: Individual or Group Protection?, 39 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 602, 602-06 (2003) (arguing that individuals
harshly judge in-group members who threaten the clarity and positivity of the
group’s identity).
24. Hewstone et al., supra note 23, at 580-83 (identifying five theories that
have emerged in the literature).
25. See Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup
Conflict, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 40 (William G.
Austin & Stephen Worchel eds., 1979).
26. See, e.g., Michael A. Hogg, Uncertainty, Social Identity, and Ideology, in 22
SOC. IDENTIFICATION IN GROUPS 203, 209-15 (Shane R. Thye & Edward J. Lawler
eds., 2005).
27. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3; accord David G. Rand et al., Dynamic
Remodeling of In-Group Bias During the 2008 Presidential Election, 106 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6187, 6187 (2009) (“In-group favoritism, or solidarity, is a welldocumented aspect of human behavior. People give members of their own group
preferential treatment, and often discriminate against members of other groups.”)
(internal citation omitted).
28. James H. Fowler & Cindy D. Kam, Beyond the Self: Social Identity,
Altruism, and Political Participation, 69 J. POL. 813, 814 (2007).
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Democrat or Republican, the less favorably he or she treated
the other party’s members.29
B. The Authors’ Classification of Speakers’ Ideological
Affiliations
Launching “the first full-blown test of ideological ingroup bias in the judicial context,”30 Professors Epstein,
Parker, and Segal hypothesized that the justices’ “votes are
neither reflexively pro- or anti- the First Amendment but
rather pro- or anti- the speaker’s ideological enclave.”31 They
suspected, in other words, that the “justices are opportunistic
free speechers,” tending to support the First Amendment
claims of speakers they regard as ideological allies and to
oppose the claims of speakers they regard as ideological
adversaries.32 To test that theory, the authors had to make
judgments about the identity of the “speaker’s ideological
team”33 in each of the free-expression cases that fell within
the study’s time period. The authors evidently did not find
that task difficult. Two of the authors independently coded
the speakers’ ideologies in all of the cases decided between
the 2005 and 2010 terms.34 Finding that “[t]here was almost
no disagreement in their codings,” one of the authors then
coded the many remaining cases in the study, using the
criteria that the authors believed they shared.35 They
explained those criteria as follows:
The idea here is to assess the ideological grouping of the speaker—
such that anti-gay or pro-life expressers, to provide two examples,
are coded as “conservative” speakers . . . . This variable is
29. See id. at 824; see also id. at 815 (“[S]ocial identity theory suggests that
individuals gain utility from affiliating with social groups, from bestowing
benefits upon the ingroup, and from withholding benefits from the outgroup.”).
30. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 4.
31. Id. at 6.
32. Id. at 3; see also id. at 6 (hypothesizing that the justices “engage in
opportunistic behavior following from litigant favoritism”).
33. See id. at 6.
34. Id. at 10 n.17.
35. Id.; see also Email from Christopher Parker to Todd E. Pettys (May 27,
2014, 10:05 CST) (on file with author) (describing the coding procedure).
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liberal . . . if the speakers were students espousing liberal causes,
war protestors burning American flags, or donors providing support
to or associating with left-wing organizations, and so on.36

In the examples that the authors provide, the accuracy of
their classifications seems clear enough. Two of their three
illustrations of liberal speakers, for example, are people
espousing or associating with “liberal” or “left-wing” causes—
it’s hard to disagree with illustrations that incorporate the
very term being illustrated. But what about other cases? How
much ambiguity lies beneath those three closing words “and
so on”? In his coverage for the New York Times, Adam Liptak
acknowledged that “[t]here may be quibbles about how [the
study’s authors] coded individual votes,” but he said that it
“usually [is not] hard to assign an ideological direction to
particular speakers or positions.”37 Is it really true that those
who are skeptical of some of the study’s conclusions can raise
nothing more than quibbles?
Before proceeding to address that question in the balance
of this Article, it is worth pausing for a moment to consider
the heavy weight that the authors’ brief explanation-byexamples must carry. In a 2002 article in the University of
Chicago Law Review, Professors Epstein and Gary King
elaborated on ways in which, in their judgment, “the current
state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed.”38 They
persuasively argued that, among other things, “[g]ood
empirical work adheres to the replication standard: another
researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on,
and reproduce the research without any additional
information from the author.”39 By providing only a brief
description of how they assessed whether speakers were
liberal or conservative—a description that relies entirely
36. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10.
37. Liptak, supra note 2.
38. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6
(2002).
39. Id. at 38; see also id. (stating that researchers should “provide
information . . . sufficient to replicate the results in principle”); Frank Cross et
al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 137
(2002) (“The ability of scholars to replicate each other’s work independently is a
central component of the scholarly enterprise, and it is one that Epstein and King
rightly emphasize.”).

2015]

EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL CRITIQUE

11

upon uncontroversial examples—Professors Epstein, Parker,
and Segal appear to assure the reader that most speakers’
predominantly conservative or liberal affiliations can easily
be determined by anyone with a reasonable grasp on those
ideological concepts.
That assurance becomes even more significant when one
considers other features of strong empirical work. In their
2002 article, Professors Epstein and King stressed the
importance of ensuring that one’s empirical research is both
reliable and valid—reliable in the sense that “a measure . . .
produces the same results repeatedly regardless of who or
what is actually doing the measuring,”40 and valid in the
sense that a reliable measure accurately “reflects the
underlying concept being measured.”41 (They usefully give
the example of a bathroom scale: it is reliable if I step on it
many times in a row and it repeatedly indicates the same
weight, and it is valid if the weight it indicates is accurate.)42
Replicability and reliability are related in important ways,
with conceptual vagueness often lying at the heart of any
difficulties concerning the two. “[W]hen researchers produce
measures that others cannot replicate,” Professors Epstein
and King explained, “it is the researchers’ problem: they, not
the replicators, must take responsibility. . . . A major source
of unreliability in measurement is vagueness: if researchers
cannot replicate a measure, it is probably because the
original study did not adequately describe it.”43
With those concerns in mind, Professors Epstein and
King underscored the importance of limiting the latitude for
subjective judgments when measuring a given phenomenon:
As a rule . . . human judgment should be removed as much as
possible from measurement or, when judgment is necessary, the
rules underlying the judgments should be clarified enough to make
them wholly transparent to other researchers. The key to producing
40. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 83.
41. Id. at 87.
42. Id. at 83.
43. Id.; see also id. at 76 (stating that “the closer researchers can come to
clarifying concepts so that they can measure them empirically, the better their
tests will be”).
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reliable measures is to write down a set of very precise rules for the
coders . . . to follow—with as little as possible left to interpretation
and human judgment. This list should be made even if the
investigator codes the data him- or herself, since without it others
would not be able to replicate the research (and the
measure) . . . . This is the way to conduct research and how it should
be judged.44

Judging Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s study by
those standards, they give the impression that the bases for
classifying speakers as liberal or conservative are so widely
and consistently perceived—among conservatives and
liberals alike—that they do not require elaboration beyond a
few obvious examples aimed at reassuring readers that this
is conceptual territory with which we all are familiar. They
appear to assure their readers, in other words, that just as
two of them agreed about how to code nearly all of the
speakers in cases decided between the 2005 and 2010 terms,45
we would agree with their ideological classifications of nearly
all of the speakers in their study if we were doing the coding
ourselves, even though the authors have not given us a
“wholly transparent” and “very precise” set of coding rules to
follow.46 Given the stakes that Professors Epstein and King
described, those are remarkable assurances—and, as I will
show, they ultimately prove ill-founded in a remarkably large
number of instances.
Of course, the fact that the authors did not provide their
readers with a detailed set of coding criteria does not mean
that they lacked such criteria altogether. Their primary
source of guidance was the publicly available Supreme Court
44. Id. at 85. Professors Epstein and Segal have elsewhere stressed the need
for conceptual precision when trying to measure the effects of ideology, explaining
that researchers must make conservatism and liberalism “susceptible to
observation” by developing “precise” definitions of those concepts. See Lee Epstein
& Jeffrey A. Segal, Trumping the First Amendment?, 21 WASH . U. J.L. & POL’Y
81, 87 (2006); see generally Jens B. Asendorpf et al., Recommendations for
Increasing Replicability in Psychology, 27 EUR. J. PERSONALITY 108, 109 & n.1
(2013) (discussing replicability and reproducibility, acknowledging that different
disciplines use varying terms for these concepts, and stressing the need for
subsequent researchers to have access to original researchers’ “code book”).
45. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
46. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 85.
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Database, from which the authors derived their initial data
set.47 The managers of that database have developed
protocols for determining whether the Court’s treatment of
given issues is conservative or liberal in nature and have
used those protocols to classify more than half a century’s
worth of Court decisions.48 Professors Epstein, Parker, and
Segal considered those classifications when coding justices’
votes.49 They did not (and could not) simply apply the
Supreme Court Database’s coding protocols to all of the cases
in their study without making at least some categorizing
decisions of their own,50 however, nor did they provide
readers with an explanation of the criteria they used when
deciding whether a given ideological classification was
ultimately appropriate. Moreover, as I will explain in Part V,
there are reasons to fear that the Supreme Court Database’s
own ideological classifications are not entirely trustworthy.
At the end of the day, therefore, Professors Epstein, Parker,
and Segal are depending heavily upon readers’ willingness to
embrace their implication that assigning ideological
identities to speakers and speech is as easy as it is in the few
47. In a helpful email, one of the study’s authors explained that they used as a
guideline the Database’s standards for determining whether the Court’s decisions
are conservative or liberal, and that the authors caucused about how to handle
free-expression cases that those standards did not address. Email from
Christopher Parker to Todd E. Pettys (May 27, 2014, 11:14 CST) (on file with
author); see generally Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 7-11 (describing their
methodology).
48. See Online Code Book: Decision Direction, SUPREME COURT DATABASE,
http://scdb.wustl.edu/documentation.php?var=decisionDirection (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014).
49. See, e.g., Summary, supra note 6, at 2 n.4 (“For many cases (92.5% of the
4,519 votes), our coding accords with the Database’s direction variable but there
are notable exceptions.”).
50. See id. (explaining that “[t]o ensure consistency with our First Amendment
concerns, we rechecked the coding of all votes and made alterations as
necessary”). Although the Database’s protocols could provide a starting point in
many cases, the authors could not simply adopt them wholesale because they
were not designed specifically for the purpose of capturing the ideological
affiliations of all speakers and all speech. Cf. Online Code Book: Decision
Direction, supra note 48 (“In order to determine whether the Court supports or
opposes the issue to which the case pertains, this variable codes the ideological
‘direction’ of the decision.”).
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examples that they provide.
So, just how uncontroversial are the authors’ ideological
classifications? Unfortunately, it does not take long for the
close reader of their study to begin to run into difficulties.
C. An Introduction to the Problems
The authors’ handling of Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican Party51 illustrates some of the
kinds of problems one finds. First, the authors simplistically
classified this as a case featuring a speaker hailing from the
conservative enclave.52 Absent an after-the-fact explanation
from the authors, one would surmise that they did so because
the Washington State Republican Party prominently appears
in the name of the case as the party challenging the
Washington law. An “et al.” follows that reference to the
Republicans in the case’s formal caption, however, and that
is because the Republicans were joined in the litigation by
the Washington State Democratic Central Committee and
the Libertarian Party of Washington State. Those political
parties argued that a newly adopted law concerning the
state’s election system—a law that allowed candidates to selfdesignate their party preferences on primary ballots—was
51. 552 U.S. 442 (2008).
52. Throughout this Article, I describe the authors’ coding decisions. The
authors of the study initially made those decisions publicly available in an Excel
spreadsheet posted on Professor Epstein’s faculty webpage. See Lee Epstein:
Research, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.
html (first visited May 16, 2014) [hereinafter Codings] (providing a link to an
Excel file that was posted on May 2, 2014). That version of the spreadsheet was
removed within days of this Article being posted on SSRN, and was replaced with
a new, more abbreviated spreadsheet. Recognizing that the authors might make
further changes to the way in which they report their coding decisions, I simply
cite in this Article to the version of the Excel spreadsheet that was originally
posted on May 2, 2014. Copies of that spreadsheet are on file with me and the
Buffalo Law Review and will be made available upon request. In that
spreadsheet, the authors’ coding of the speakers’ ideologies appears in column I
under the heading “speechdir” and their coding of the justices’ votes as either
“pro-speech” or “anti-speech” appears in column E under the heading “jvote.” For
ease of reference, I will refer to the Excel spreadsheet as “Codings” and will
provide citations to the line numbers on which the cited coding decisions appear.
The authors’ coding of the speakers’ ideology in Washington State Grange appears
on line 4487.
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facially invalid because it “compels [the political parties] to
associate with candidates they do not endorse, alters the
messages they wish to convey, and forces them to engage in
counterspeech to disassociate themselves from the
candidates and their positions on the issues.”53 The
Republicans, Democrats, and Libertarians all appeared
before the Court as respondents and each filed briefs
opposing the Washington law on First Amendment grounds.54
The fact that all three of those ideologically diverse parties
were appearing as litigants was not lost on the Court. In his
majority opinion, Justice Thomas explicitly noted that the
Democrats and Libertarians joined the lawsuit soon after the
Republicans filed their complaint,55 and he consistently
referred to the political parties in the plural.56 With those
three parties jointly advancing the same set of First
Amendment arguments, there is no basis for assuming that
the justices saw the speakers as coming from one ideological
enclave but not the other.
In a brief response to this critique, the authors said they
classified the case based upon the nature of the political
parties’ free-expression claim, rather than upon the usual
ideological identities of the parties themselves: “Regardless
of the participation of the Democratic Party in this case, we
consider an argument in favor of limiting voter participation
in elections (and therefore giving more influence to party
elites in choosing nominees) to be a more conservative

53. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 454. The Washington law stated “that
candidates for office shall be identified on the ballot by their self-designated ‘party
preference’; that voters may vote for any candidate; and that the top two
votegetters for each office, regardless of party preference, advance to the general
election.” Id. at 444.
54. See Brief for Respondent Libertarian Party of Washington, Wash. State
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos. 06-713, 06730); Brief for Respondent Washington State Democratic Central Committee,
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos.
06-713, 06-730); Brief for Respondents Wash. State Republican Party et al., Wash.
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (Nos. 06-713,
06-730).
55. See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 448.
56. See, e.g., id. at 449, 452-53, 458-59.
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argument (entrenched interests).”57 That explanation
plunges us into difficulties that will reappear elsewhere in
this Article. First, we have quickly traveled a long distance
from anti-gay speech and pro-life speech, the two examples of
conservative expression that the authors provided when
originally describing their coding criteria.58 Is there any
reliable basis to believe that conservative justices would
regard the Democratic, Libertarian, and Republican parties’
opposition to Washington’s law as a hallmark of their own
ideological in-group, while liberal justices would regard the
parties’ opposition as a hallmark of their ideological enemies?
Is it really on the basis of their positions on this kind of issue
that justices are widely regarded as liberal or conservative in
the first place?
Second, the authors provide no reason to be confident
that, when it comes to ideological in-group bias in freeexpression settings, a justice will make his or her in-group
and out-group assessments based upon the perceived
ideological slant of the First Amendment claim, rather than
upon the usual ideological affinity that he or she may feel for
one or more of the claimants. As I discuss in Part II.E, trying
to capture the justices’ ideological perceptions takes on an
added level of speculation when, in a given case, the usual
ideological identity of a speaker diverges from the ideological
tenor of the speech that the speaker produces. As we will see,
the authors themselves show evidence of resolving those
uncertainties inconsistently, sometimes focusing on the
speech and sometimes focusing on the speaker.59 Absent a
persuasive response to such objections, I would regard the
authors’ classification of Washington State Grange as
erroneous (or, at best, as highly debatable). The justices’
57. Appendix C (Excel version), line 4368 (Sept. 30, 2014),
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBias.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014)
(on file with author). Appendix C is part of a set of separately posted response
materials that Professor Epstein placed on her faculty webpage shortly after an
earlier draft of this Article appeared on SSRN. Anticipating that the authors
might further amend those response materials, a copy of the September 30
version of Appendix C is on file with the author and the Buffalo Law Review and
will be made available upon request.
58. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Part II.E.
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votes in that case cannot reliably tell us anything about the
justices’ ideological in-group favoritism.60
Even if the authors accurately captured the justices’ own
perceptions by coding the case as one involving conservative
expression, a different coding problem caused them to state
an exaggerated version of the empirical case against Justice
Alito. The authors coded him as voting for the political
parties.61 That was a mistake. Justice Alito joined Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion rejecting the political parties’
claims and joined Chief Justice Roberts’s concurring opinion
responding to Justice Scalia’s pro-speaker dissent.62 If Justice
Alito’s vote had been coded accurately, and if the authors had
been correct in categorizing this as a case involving
conservative (but not liberal) speakers, the authors would
have reported that Justice Alito voted in favor of conservative
speakers 46.2%—rather than 53.9%—of the time.63
Such mistakes would not be worth much of a fuss if the
study’s problematic treatment of Washington State Grange
were anomalous. But when one takes a look at how the
study’s authors handled many other cases, additional
problems appear. Taken as a group, the number of errors and
reasonably debatable classifications is sufficiently large that
one ought to regard at least some of the authors’ conclusions
with caution.
II. ERRORS AND QUESTIONABLE CLASSIFICATIONS
I reviewed the authors’ treatment of all cases decided
between 1987 and the close of the study’s time period,
amounting to 30% of the more than 500 cases in their study.
60. Accord Volokh, supra note 16 (“[H]ow can one measure whether speakers
are ‘left or right of center’ when the case involves speech and speakers that aren’t
particularly ideological, or that are ideological in ways that are hard to see as
‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’—or involves a bipartisan (or multi-ideological) coalition
of claimants?”).
61. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4487.
62. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442
(2008); id. at 459 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
63. Cf. supra Table A (summarizing the authors’ findings concerning Justice
Alito and the other members of the Roberts Court).
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In that review, I examined the authors’ ideological
classifications of those cases’ First Amendment claimants
and the authors’ coding of Chief Justice Roberts’s, Justice
Scalia’s, and Justice Alito’s votes. The results of that review
are troubling. Of the 159 cases I reviewed, I found one or
more errors or readily debatable judgments in 40 cases, or in
25% of those I examined.64 I devote a fair amount of space to
describing those problems in the pages that follow, both to
lay the groundwork for an evaluation of the authors’
treatment of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito and to
demonstrate that researchers’ methods of gathering and
coding data on the justices’ ideological voting patterns may
be ripe for reevaluation.
With varying degrees of frequency, the authors logged
justices as voting for or against speakers in cases having
nothing to do with free expression; they incorrectly assessed
whether justices voted for or against First Amendment
claimants; their conclusions about speakers’ ideological
identities are either erroneous or subject to reasonable
debate; they failed to come to grips with the problems that
arise when the ideological affiliations of speakers and their
speech diverge; they included speakers whom it is difficult to
imagine any justice regarding as ideological teammates; and
they double-counted at least one litigant who appeared twice
before the Court during the course of a single lawsuit.
A. Erroneous Inclusion of Cases Having Nothing to Do with
Expression
Despite their professed focus on free-expression
litigation, the authors included at least a handful of cases in
which there were, in fact, no First Amendment speakers.65
The authors included Department of the Navy v. Egan66 in
64. I catalogue the problematic cases in the Appendix to this Article, infra.
65. The problem’s origins lie in how these cases are coded in the Supreme
Court Database, see infra Part V (discussing limitations that afflict the Supreme
Court Database), and in the authors’ refusal—even once made aware of the
problem—to second-guess the way in which the database codes these cases, see
infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text.
66. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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their study, for example, somehow determining that the case
was one involving a liberal speaker.67 That case had nothing
to do with the First Amendment. Thomas Egan lost his job at
a Navy facility when he was denied a security clearance due
to past criminal convictions and prior problems with
alcohol.68 The “narrow question” before the Court was
“whether the Merit Systems Protection Board . . . has
authority by statute to review the substance of an underlying
decision to deny or revoke a security clearance in the course
of reviewing an adverse action.”69 In his brief on the merits,
Egan had framed precisely that same issue for the Court.70 It
was not a free-expression case.
Neither was Carlucci v. Doe,71 another case that the
study’s authors believed featured a liberal speaker.72 As
Justice White explained in his ruling for a unanimous Court,
the issue was “whether the National Security Agency (NSA)
invoked the proper statutory authority when it terminated
respondent John Doe, an NSA employee.”73 Doe was fired
after he “disclosed to NSA officials that he had engaged in
homosexual relationships with foreign nationals.”74 In his
brief to the Court, Doe framed the issue much like the Court
itself later did: “Whether an employee of the National
Security Agency, dismissed ‘in the interests of national
security,’ is entitled to a hearing pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7532,
when the summary termination authority in 50 U.S.C. 833 is
not invoked.”75 As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
67. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1320.
68. Egan, 484 U.S. at 521.
69. Id. at 520.
70. See Brief for the Respondent at i, Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)
(No. 86-1552) (“Whether, in the course of reviewing the removal of an employee
for failure to maintain a required security clearance, the Merit Systems
Protection Board is authorized by statute to review the substance of the
underlying decision to deny or revoke the security clearance.”).
71. 488 U.S. 93 (1988).
72. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1388.
73. Carlucci, 488 U.S. at 95.
74. Id. at 97.
75. Brief for Respondent at i, Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988) (No. 87-751).
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had explained more fully below, Doe wanted a hearing to
develop his argument that (among other things) the decision
to fire him was “motivated by an unconstitutional prejudice
against homosexuals.”76 Just as one would predict from the
question on which it had granted certiorari, the Supreme
Court disposed of the case entirely on statutory grounds,
saying nothing about the First Amendment.
A similar case—again having nothing to do with free
speech, but which the authors logged as involving a liberal
speaker77—was Webster v. Doe.78 The Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) fired Doe after he disclosed he was gay and the
agency concluded he posed a security risk.79 Doe filed suit,
alleging (among other things) that the CIA had “deprived him
of constitutionally protected rights to property, liberty, and
privacy in violation of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.”80 Although he thus cited the First
Amendment among a cluster of constitutional provisions
giving him privacy and liberty rights, he never advanced a
claim concerning his freedom of expression. The sole issue
before the Court was whether the CIA’s decision to fire Doe
was subject to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedures Act.81 A majority of the justices concluded that
Doe could present his constitutional claims in federal court.82
In the ensuing lower-court proceedings, Doe advanced three
constitutional claims: a denial of equal protection, a denial of
his right to privacy, and a denial of “a due process property
interest in employment.”83 The case never had anything to do
with expressive freedoms.
76. Doe v. Weinberger, 820 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d sub nom.
Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988).
77. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1280.
78. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
79. Id. at 595.
80. Id. at 596.
81. Id. at 598-99.
82. See id. at 601-05.
83. Doe v. Webster, 769 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1991), aff’d in part and rev’d in
part sub nom. Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
928 (1993).
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The fact that Egan, Carlucci, and Webster all concerned
employees whom the government deemed security risks
suggests that something went awry when the study’s authors
tried to pull free-expression cases from the Supreme Court
Database.84 Regardless of the mechanics that would explain
why these (and possibly other85) irrelevant cases were swept
up in the net that the authors initially cast, the authors
should have removed them before proceeding with their
analysis. These cases had nothing to do with the subject
matter of the authors’ study. The authors have provided a
discouraging yet illuminating response to this critique, which
I will recount at the close of this Article.86
Of course, most of the cases in the study did concern First
Amendment free-expression claims. When examining the
authors’ handling of those cases, however, one finds a range
of other problems.
B. Erroneous Coding of Justices’ Votes
The authors sometimes failed to accurately determine
whether justices voted for or against the First Amendment
claimants. As I have already noted, for example, the authors
coded Justice Alito as voting in favor of the political parties
in Washington State Grange,87 even though he joined the
majority opinion rejecting the political parties’ claims.
One finds a similar set of errors in the authors’ handling
of Beard v. Banks.88 In that case, a state prisoner objected to
a prison policy that denied him access to newspapers,
magazines, and photographs.89 Justice Breyer wrote for a
four-member plurality rejecting the prisoner’s claim, with
Justices Thomas and Scalia concurring in the judgment on

84. See supra note 3 (noting the authors’ use of the Supreme Court Database).
85. Again, I reviewed only 30% of the cases within the authors’ data set.
86. See infra notes 407-09 and accompanying text.
87. See supra Part I.C.
88. 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
89. See id. at 527 (plurality opinion).
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grounds even more favorable to prison officials.90 The authors
correctly coded the Court as a whole as voting against the
prisoner but somehow determined that Chief Justice Roberts
voted in the prisoner’s favor.91 That was a mistake—the Chief
Justice joined Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion.92 In fact, the
authors erroneously coded the votes of all of the participating
justices in this case,93 mistakenly logging Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer as voting in the speaker’s
favor,94 while tallying Justices Stevens and Ginsburg as
voting against him.95
The authors’ handling of Justice Scalia provides a few
additional illustrations. When evaluating United States v. XCitement Video, Inc.,96 the authors determined that he voted
against a liberal speaker.97 The case concerned the criminal
conviction of Rubin Gottesman (X-Citement’s owner) for
shipping in interstate commerce videotapes of actress Traci
Lords engaging in sexually explicit conduct prior to her
eighteenth birthday.98 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had vacated the conviction, finding the federal
statute at issue facially unconstitutional because it did not
require defendants to know that recordings they were
shipping or receiving contained minors engaged in sexually
explicit conduct.99 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that
the statute did indeed demand knowledge “both [of] the
90. See id. at 525 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e find, on the basis of the record now
before us, that prison officials have set forth adequate legal support for the
policy.”); id. at 536-37 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that only
the Eighth Amendment constrains states’ ability to define the terms of
imprisonment).
91. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4471.
92. See Banks, 548 U.S. at 521.
93. Justice Alito did not participate.
94. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3830 (Scalia); id. at line 4025 (Kennedy);
id. at line 4080 (Souter); id. at line 4208 (Thomas); id. at line 4448 (Breyer).
95. See id. at line 3553 (Stevens); id. at line 4340 (Ginsburg).
96. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
97. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3789.
98. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 66.
99. Id. at 67.
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sexually explicit nature of the material and [of] the age of the
performers.”100 Although expressing views favorable to the
government in this general area of regulation, Justice Scalia
dissented, taking the position that the statute could not
reasonably bear the majority’s interpretation, that the
properly construed statute “establishes a severe deterrent,
not narrowly tailored to its purposes, upon fully protected
First Amendment activities,” and that Gottesman’s
“conviction cannot stand.”101 He voted for Gottesman, not
against him. The authors have subsequently (and curiously)
defended their coding of Justice Scalia’s dissent by stating
that they were “coding votes (not opinions), in accord with a
set of established rules.”102 It is difficult to imagine what
worthy set of vote-focused, reality-reflecting rules would
dictate that Justice Scalia’s vote to vacate Gottesman’s
conviction should be logged as an anti-speaker vote.
One finds a similar problem in the authors’ treatment of
Pope v. Illinois.103 In that case, two attendants at an adult
bookstore had been convicted of violating Illinois’s obscenity
statute.104 The attendants argued that their convictions
violated the First Amendment because the jury had not been
properly instructed to use an objective test—rather than the
locality’s or state’s community standards—to determine
whether the materials at issue had serious political, artistic,
scientific, or literary value.105 The proper remedy, the
attendants said, would be to reverse their convictions.106
Justice Scalia joined the Court’s majority opinion embracing
the attendants’ First Amendment argument, rejecting the
state’s defense of the jury instructions, and remanding for
100. Id. at 78-79.
101. Id. at 86 (Scalia, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Court today saves a single conviction by putting in place a relatively toothless
child-pornography law that Congress did not enact, and by rendering
congressional strengthening of that new law more difficult.”).
102. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3743 (incorporating by reference the
explanation given on line 3133).
103. 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
104. See id. at 499.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 501.
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harmless-error analysis (rather than invalidating the
convictions outright).107 The authors counted this as a vote
against a liberal speaker.108 Is that a fair characterization of
Justice Scalia’s actions when he agreed with the attendants’
First Amendment claim but stopped short of giving them
their most favorable remedy? Elsewhere in their study, the
authors themselves provide reason to doubt it. When
evaluating a different case (Dawson v. Delaware109), the
authors counted Justice Scalia as voting in favor of a
conservative speaker when he voted to accept the speaker’s
First Amendment argument but also to remand for harmlesserror analysis.110 Needless to say, the conflict between those
coding decisions cannot be resolved by supposing that a
remand for harmless-error analysis is irrelevant when
Justice Scalia otherwise supported a conservative speaker,
but that the same remand negates a vote that would
otherwise count as support for a liberal speaker.
The authors again failed to fairly characterize Justice
Scalia’s vote in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri.111 Charles
Guarnieri, a unionized employee, alleged that his former
municipal employer violated his constitutional rights by
firing him in retaliation for asserting his legal rights in an
earlier workplace dispute.112 He argued that, to prevail under
the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, he did not need to
prove that the matter for which he suffered retaliation was a
matter of public concern.113 Justice Scalia filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part, and the authors counted it as a vote against Guarnieri,
107. See id. at 500-04.
108. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3782. They have tried to defend their
decision, again opaquely stating that they were “coding votes (not opinions), in
accord with a set of established rules.” Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3133.
109. 503 U.S. 159 (1992); see also infra notes 188-96 and accompanying text
(discussing the authors’ problematic handling of Dawson).
110. See Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168-69 (inviting the lower court to take up the
harmless-error issue on remand); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3807.
111. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
112. Id. at 2492.
113. See id. at 2491.
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just as they counted the vote of the Court as a whole.114 Unlike
the majority, however, Justice Scalia agreed with Guarnieri’s
contention that, to bring a claim under the Petition Clause,
he need not show that the matter for which he suffered
retaliation was a matter of public concern.115 Moreover,
although Justice Scalia concluded that Guarnieri could not
cite his union grievance as a basis for a First Amendment
retaliation claim,116 he nevertheless believed there were
grounds on which Guarnieri should win. Because the parties
had agreed (over Justice Scalia’s doubts) that lawsuits are
“petitions” protected by the Petition Clause, Justice Scalia
contended that Guarnieri should prevail on his claim alleging
that he suffered retaliation for bringing a Section 1983 action
against city officials.117 (That was the basis on which a portion
of his opinion was labeled a dissent.) The authors thus erred
when they simplistically coded Justice Scalia as voting
against the speaker. The authors have since tried to justify
their coding decision by again reiterating that they were
“coding votes, not opinions.”118 Once again, however, that
opaque explanation fails to take account of Justice Scalia’s
vote to dissent from a portion of the majority’s anti-speaker
judgment.
One of the authors’ mistakes when coding Justice Scalia’s
votes worked to his advantage in the study. In Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,119 a
Christian student group challenged the University of
Virginia’s denial of their request for funding.120 The authors
coded the students as conservative but logged Justice Scalia
114. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3777.
115. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2504-06 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 2506 (stating that the Petition Clause should not protect employees
from retaliation for petitions that “are addressed to the government in its capacity
as the petitioners’ employer” and that “[a] union grievance is the epitome” of such
a petition).
117. Id. at 2506-07.
118. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 4490.
119. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
120. See id. at 822-27.
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as voting against them.121 The latter was a mistake. Justice
Scalia joined Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, ruling in
the students’ favor.122 Once that error was pointed out to
them, the authors corrected it.123
C. Erroneous Classifications of Speakers’ Ideological
Identities
There are numerous cases in which there are good
reasons to conclude that the authors incorrectly classified
speakers’ ideological identities. As I have already explained,
for example, the authors coded the speakers in Washington
State Grange as conservative, thereby either disregarding
the fact that the Washington State Republican Party—the
speaker named in the case caption—was joined by the
Washington State Democratic Central Committee and the
Libertarian Party of Washington State; overestimating the
likelihood that the justices themselves regarded the parties’
claims as ideologically conservative in nature; or making an
undefended assumption that—in the eyes of a justice driven
by in-group bias—the ideological quality of the speech always
trumps the usual ideological identity of the speaker.124
The same kinds of problems afflict the authors’
classification of New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez
Torres125 as a case involving a liberal speaker.126 Margarita
Lopez Torres had repeatedly tried and failed to secure the
Democratic nomination for a seat on the Supreme Court of
New York.127 She alleged that the state’s system of using
political parties’ conventions to select Supreme Court justices
violated her First Amendment right of association.128 A
majority of the Court rejected that claim.129 If Lopez Torres’s
121. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3883.
122. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 822, 845-46.
123. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3797.
124. See supra Part I.C.
125. 552 U.S. 196 (2008).
126. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3904.
127. See Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 201.
128. See id. at 203-04.
129. See id. at 203-07.
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Democratic affiliation were all one knew about the case, one
would indeed classify the case’s First Amendment claimant
as liberal. Yet even then, the case would be problematic for
purposes of the authors’ study because a loss for Lopez Torres
would amount to a win for the state’s Democratic Party, and
vice versa. It thus would be difficult for a justice to determine
on which side of the “v” his or her ideological opponents or
allies appeared. Would a bias-driven conservative rather vote
against a Democratic judicial candidate or against the
Democratic Party whose nomination the candidate sought?
Just as in Washington State Grange, however, there were
multiple parties involved in the case. Lopez Torres was one
of nine plaintiff-respondents challenging the New York
system, a group that included both Democratic and
Republican candidates for judicial office and both Democratic
and Republican voters who objected to the state’s manner of
selecting Supreme Court justices.130 Correspondingly,
beneath the “et al.” on the other side of the “v” were (among
others) the New York Republican State Committee and the
New York County Democratic Committee.131 Because the case
concerned the jointly asserted First Amendment claims of
Democrats and Republicans against their respective political
parties, because there is no persuasive reason to assume that
conservative and liberal justices made different in-group and
out-group assessments of the plaintiffs’ challenge to the
convention system, and because the authors provide no
reason to believe that the ideological quality of speech always
trumps the usual ideological identity of the speaker, the case
probably should have been excluded from the study. It simply
does not give us a reliable basis for assessing a justice’s
susceptibility to in-group bias.
The authors’ handling of California Democratic Party v.
130. See id. at 201 (noting that Lopez Torres was joined by other judicial
candidates and voters); Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4-9,
Lopez Torres v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 411 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(04-CV-1129), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/
documents/complaint_004.pdf (describing each of the parties to the lawsuit).
131. Cf. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 203 (“[B]oth the Republican and Democratic
state parties have intervened from the very early stages of this litigation to defend
New York’s electoral law.”).
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Jones132 is even more objectionable. The issue in that case
concerned political parties’ objection to California’s decision
to allow non-party members to vote in parties’ primary
elections.133 The authors classified the case’s First
Amendment claimants as liberal,134 perhaps due to the
identity of the speaker identified in the name of the case. As
the fourth paragraph of the Court’s opinion explains,
however, the Democrats were joined by the California
Republican Party, the Libertarian Party of California, and
the Peace and Freedom Party.135
The authors have tried to explain their coding of the case,
stating that “[a] challenge to the party establishment to offer
more inclusion in the nomination process and on the ballots
[is driven by] a liberal motivation regardless of which party
is being challenged.”136 I have already questioned the
accuracy of the authors’ assumption that conservative and
liberal justices would indeed make differing in-group and
out-group assessments of a case on those sorts of grounds.137
But even if that were a sound basis for coding the expression
in California Democratic Party, the authors have got things
exactly backward. The First Amendment claimants were the
political parties resisting non-party voting in primary
elections. On the authors’ explanation of their coding
decision, they should have coded the case as one featuring
conservative expression, not liberal.
The same problems recurred in Eu v. San Francisco
County Democratic Central Committee.138 The Democrats in
that case objected to various ways in which California law
restricted their party activities, such as by banning official
party endorsements in primary elections, limiting the tenure
132. 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
133. See id. at 569-70.
134. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3071.
135. See Cal. Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 571.
136. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3985 (incorporating by reference the
explanation provided on line 4359).
137. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text (discussing Washington State
Grange).
138. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
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of party chairs, and requiring geographic rotation of party
chairholders.139 The authors coded the First Amendment
claimants as liberal,140 perhaps in part because the San
Francisco Democrats were named in the case caption. Once
again, however, political parties from across the ideological
spectrum joined together to advance the same set of
constitutional arguments. As Justice Marshall explained
early in his opinion for the Court, the suit was brought by
“[v]arious county central committees of the Democratic and
Republican Parties, the state central committee of the
Libertarian Party, members of various state and county
central committees, and other groups and individuals active
in partisan politics.”141 How would an opportunistic, biasdriven justice know where to turn?
In an attempt to justify their coding decision, the authors
have reiterated their view that “[a] challenge to the party
establishment to offer more inclusion in the nomination
process and on the ballots” is ideologically liberal in nature.142
Unfortunately, the authors are again confused about the
facts. The First Amendment claimants in Eu were the
political parties themselves, not those challenging the
parties’ preferred ways of doing business. On the authors’
explanation, they should have coded the case as one involving
conservative expression. The mismatch between coding
decisions and explanations lends strength to the worry that,
at the time the coding decisions were being made in the first
instance, case captions played an outsized role.
The case caption evidently once again caused problems
for the authors when coding Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois.143 The authors determined that the First
Amendment claimants in that case were conservative.144
Those claimants were individuals who alleged that the
139. See id. at 216-19.
140. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1065.
141. Eu, 489 U.S. at 219.
142. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3305 (incorporating by reference the
explanation provided on line 4359).
143. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
144. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1106.
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Republican Governor of Illinois denied them jobs,
promotions, or transfers because they were not supporters of
the Republican Party and because they lacked the support of
local Republican officials.145 There is no reason to suppose
that conservative justices would regard those individuals as
desirable beneficiaries of preferential voting.
A narrow focus on the First Amendment claimant named
in the caption also appears to have led the authors into
trouble when evaluating United States v. National Treasury
Employees Union.146 That case concerned a federal law
barring nearly all federal employees from receiving
honoraria for their speaking and writing engagements.147 The
law’s primary purpose was to avoid the ethical problems that
could arise when federal employees received honoraria for
speaking or writing about matters relating to their
employment.148 The ban, however, extended even to speeches
and writings dealing with non-work matters.149 The National
Treasury Employees Union—one of several plaintiffs who
filed lawsuits challenging the restriction—was named to
represent the class of all Executive Branch employees below
the GS-16 level who would receive honoraria but for the
federal restriction.150 One of the plaintiffs, for example, was
an attorney for the Department of Labor who lectured on
Judaism; another was a Postal Service employee who
lectured on the Quaker religion; another was an attorney for
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission who wrote on Russian
history; another was a microbiologist who reviewed dance
performances; another was a tax examiner who wrote about
environmental matters and earthquakes; another was an
aerospace engineer who lectured on African-American

145. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 66-67.
146. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
147. See id. at 457-60 (identifying the relevant statutes and administrative
regulations).
148. See id.
149. See id. at 457.
150. Id. at 461.
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history.151
The authors concluded that the case featured a liberal
speaker simply because (they have since explained) one of the
many First Amendment claimants was a union.152 Yet the
dispute had absolutely nothing to do with labor law or with
the powers of unions. Rather, the union represented a class
composed of all lower-ranking Executive Branch employees
who wished to speak and write in exchange for payment but
were barred by federal law from doing so. There is no reliable
basis for presuming that the justices saw all—or even most—
of those employees as coming from one ideological enclave
rather than the other. There certainly is no reason to think
that intelligent justices would regard the entire set of First
Amendment claims in an ideologically liberal light merely by
virtue of the fact that one of the scores of plaintiffs was a
union.
Just as the authors too quickly assumed that a case with
a union in the title involved liberal speech, they too quickly
assumed that Board of Regents v. Southworth153 involved
liberal speech because the speakers were college students. In
Southworth, a handful of students enrolled at the University
of Wisconsin raised a First Amendment objection to the
university’s use of mandatory student fees to support student
organizations and activities to which those students objected
on political or ideological grounds.154 The authors coded those
speakers as liberal,155 evidently on the assumption that
college students tend toward the ideological left. Here,
however, at least some of the students were decidedly
conservative. Among the student groups to which they
151. See id. at 461-62 (providing some of these examples); Brief for Respondents,
National Treasury Employees Union, et al. at 7-8, United States v. Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (No. 93-1170) (providing some of these
examples).
152. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3183 (coding the case); Appendix C,
supra note 57, at line 3751 (“While the individual speakers may have different
beliefs, this is also a union dispute and the [Supreme Court] Database codes the
pro-union position as liberal (unless it is a union member against the union.”).
153. 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
154. Id. at 226-27.
155. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3242.
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objected were Amnesty International; the Campus Women’s
Center; the Internationalist Socialist Organization; the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual Campus Center; the Madison AIDS
Support Network; the student chapter of the National
Organization for Women; the Progressive Student Network;
the Student Labor Action Coalition; and the UW Greens.156
That presumably is one of the reasons why conservative
organizations like the Christian Legal Society and the
Washington Legal Foundation lined up as amici curiae in
support of the students,157 while the liberal Brennan Center
for Justice and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund were among those who filed briefs in support of the
university.158
There was only one speaker in Arkansas Educational
Television Commission v. Forbes,159 and so here one
encounters difficulties of a different sort. The issue in Forbes
was whether a public television station violated the First
Amendment rights of an independent candidate named
Ralph Forbes when it refused to allow him to join a televised
debate among candidates for a congressional seat.160 The
study’s authors counted him as a liberal speaker161 because
156. See Brief for Respondents at 3-12, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S.
217 (2000) (No. 98-1189).
157. See Brief of Christian Legal Society as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189);
Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and the Committee for a Constructive
Tomorrow as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189); see generally LEE EPSTEIN,
CONSERVATIVES IN COURT 172 (1985) (explaining that the Washington Legal
Foundation was established “to defend the free enterprise system and to counter
the liberal public interest law movement”).
158. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law in Support of Petitioners, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth,
529 U.S. 217 (2000) (No. 98-1189); Brief of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Campus Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)
(No. 98-1189).
159. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
160. Id. at 669-71.
161. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3092.
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(the authors have since explained) he was advocating
“greater inclusion in the political process.”162 To judge the
likelihood that this was indeed the factor that determined the
justices’ in-group and out-group assessments of the
ideological enclave from which Forbes’s First Amendment
claim came, one might want to take a closer look at Forbes
himself. In a 1990 story, the New York Times reported that
Forbes was then seeking the Republican nomination to
become Arkansas’s lieutenant governor, that Forbes was “a
neo-Nazi white supremacist,” that he had “managed the
[1988] Presidential campaign of David Duke,” that he
declared himself to be “100 percent right-to-life” and believed
that Republicans who were soft on abortion were “wimps”
and “beady-eyed scuzzballs,” that he “advocate[d] sending
American blacks to a black homeland in Africa,” and that he
was “a fervent advocate of capital punishment.”163 That
alleged history was not forgotten when Forbes’s case arrived
at the Court. When covering the parties’ oral arguments, for
example, the Washington Post reported that Forbes was “a
former member of the American Nazi Party.”164 One simply
cannot be confident that a bias-driven liberal justice would
have seen Forbes’s case as an opportunity to secure a victory
for the liberal team.
One finds similar trouble (albeit on less inflammatory
grounds) in Burdick v. Takushi.165 Alan Burdick, a resident of
Hawaii, alleged that the state violated his First Amendment
rights of speech and association by refusing to count write-in
votes that he wished to cast in primary and general
elections.166 The authors coded him as a liberal speaker on the
rationale that Burdick was trying to open up the political

162. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3913.
163. Voters Face Racial Choice in Arkansas Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1990,
at A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/12/us/voters-face-racialchoice-in-arkansas-runoff.html.
164. Joan Biskupic, Justices Question Barring Fringe Candidates from Debates
on Public TV, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 1997, at A15, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/supcourt/stories/ark_100997.htm.
165. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
166. Id. at 430.
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process.167 There are good reasons to believe, however, that
Burdick himself identified with the conservative end of the
spectrum, and that the justices themselves knew this claim
was brought in an effort to weaken the Democratic Party’s
grip in Hawaii. The state explained in its brief that Burdick’s
dissatisfaction had blossomed when only one candidate
appeared on the Republican primary ballot to fill a seat in
the state legislature.168 Burdick was dissatisfied with that
candidate and wished to vote—in the Republican primary—
for someone else.169 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy explained
in his dissent, Hawaii’s opposition to write-in votes helped
maintain the Democratic Party’s political control in the
state.170 Indeed, as the case was winding its way to the Court,
the New York Times reported that one of the reasons Burdick
opposed Hawaii’s restriction was that “the ban on write-in
votes helps keep Hawaii politics a virtual Democratic
monopoly.”171 On what basis can we be confident that liberal
justices would regard Burdick as an ideological teammate
and that conservative justices would regard him as an
ideological enemy?
The same problem arises again in Board of County
Commissioners v. Umbehr.172 Keen Umbehr—a trash-hauler
in Kansas—sued county officials after they terminated his
contract with the county.173 Umbehr alleged that the officials
were retaliating against him for speech they found
objectionable. Umbehr had long been a thorn in county
officials’ side, frequently writing and speaking about matters
concerning landfill user rates, county officials’ alleged
violations of the state’s open-meetings law, the cost and
167. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1914; Appendix C, supra note 57, at line
3590 (incorporating by reference the explanation given on line 3913).
168. See Respondent’s Brief at 15-16, Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)
(No. 91-535).
169. See id.
170. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
171. Robert Reinhold, Hawaii Lawsuit May Test Limits of Write-In Votes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at B12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/29/us/
hawaii-lawsuit-may-test-limits-of-write-in-votes.html.
172. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
173. Id. at 671-72.
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difficulty of obtaining public records from the county, the
county’s use of taxpayer money, and the like.174 The authors
concluded he was a liberal speaker.175 Yet the matters about
which Umbehr had spoken or sought transparency were not
slanted in one ideological direction or the other—if anything,
his speech likely tended toward the conservative to the extent
he was complaining about government fees and uses of
taxpayer money. Neither the opinion, the parties’ briefs, nor
the court of appeals’ ruling below provides a reliable basis for
assuming that Umbehr was allied with the liberal ideological
team. If one digs deeper into Umbehr’s biography, one learns
that, throughout the time of this lawsuit and beyond, he
identified as a Republican and was active in Republican
politics, even once running as a Republican for county
office.176 (At the time of this writing, Umbehr is running as
the Libertarian candidate for the Kansas governorship.177).
Umbehr was certainly not a liberal and neither was his
speech, and there is nothing on the face of the record that
would have caused the justices to believe otherwise.
One again finds Republicans—this time on both sides of
174. See id. at 671.
175. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3137.
176. Telephone Interview with Keen Umbehr (May 28, 2014). Of course, the
justices might not have known about Umbehr’s Republican activism—but even if
they didn’t, they still had no clear reason to believe he was liberal. Setting that
important fact aside, the case raises a question: when trying to sniff out evidence
of in-group bias, how much knowledge should we presume the justices possess
about the players in local party politics? Consider, for example, Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992). In that case, a local party activist was working on
a city council candidate’s political campaign in Tennessee. She objected on First
Amendment grounds to a state law that restricted electioneering activities near
the entrances to polling places. See id. at 193-94. The authors regarded the
activist as a liberal speaker. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3845. The fact
that a person wishes to solicit votes or distribute campaign literature near the
entrance to a polling place tells one nothing about that person’s conservative or
liberal tilt. As far as I can tell, the parties’ briefs do not identify the political
affiliation of the party activist or of the political candidate on whose campaign
she was then working. Friends in Tennessee tell me they suspect the activist was
a Democrat. When can we safely assume that the justices themselves know (or
take steps to learn) the ideological affiliations of participants in local politics,
when the briefs do not make those affiliations clear?
177. See Libertarian Umbehr Files for Kansas Governor, NEWTON KANSAN, May
21, 2014, at 6.
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the “v”—in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia.178 In that
case, three individuals objected to the Republican Party of
Virginia’s requirement that they (like all other would-be
delegates) pay a fee to participate in a convention being held
to select the party’s nominee for United States Senator.179 The
individuals were two Republicans who had long been active
in Republican politics, plus one independent.180 The authors
coded those three First Amendment claimants as liberal.181
All three individuals wished to participate in the Republican
convention, and there is nothing in the Court’s opinion that
would lead one to believe they were liberals trying to crash
the Republicans’ party. If the fact that the plaintiffs were
trying to open up the Republicans’ political process is the
reason we are to assume that the justices saw those plaintiffs
in an ideologically liberal light,182 then we are being asked to
stretch a very long way indeed.
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic
Committee183 takes us far from the realm of intra-party
disputes among Republicans. The organizers of the Gay
Olympic Games slated to be held in San Francisco in 1982
raised a First Amendment objection to federal legislation
granting exclusive use of the word “Olympic” to the United
States Olympic Committee.184 The authors coded the Gay
Olympics’ organizers as conservative,185 notwithstanding the
conflict with one of the few coding criteria that the authors
expressly described for their readers—namely, that speech
178. 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
179. See id. at 190-91.
180. See Brief for Appellants at 6, Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S.
186 (1996) (No. 94-203).
181. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3243. The case primarily concerned the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, but the parties on both sides did infuse their statutory
arguments with First Amendment content.
182. That is the explanation that the authors have offered. See Appendix C,
supra note 57, at line 3814 (incorporating by reference the explanation given on
line 3913).
183. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
184. See id. at 525-30, 535-41.
185. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1206. Those organizers—not the
USOC—were indeed the First Amendment claimants.
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was deemed conservative if it was “anti-gay.”186
D. Questionable Classifications of Speakers’ Ideological
Identities
There are many cases in which, even if not plainly wrong,
the authors’ classifications of speakers’ ideological identities
can readily be questioned, leaving one far from certain that
those classifications correspond to the ideological identities
that the justices themselves perceived. Of course, being
reasonably certain that one has captured how the justices
perceived the speakers is critical to the task that Professors
Epstein, Parker, and Segal set for themselves. If one cannot
be reasonably sure whether a justice perceived a given
speaker as a member of an ideological in-group or out-group,
one cannot confidently use the justice’s treatment of that
speaker to measure the justice’s tendency toward ideological
in-group bias. It is the perception that a person belongs to an
in-group or out-group, after all, that triggers the temptation
of bias.187 As the following cases collectively illustrate,
identifying in binary fashion the ideological team to which a
speaker belongs can be a remarkably fuzzy business. My
purpose here is thus not to say how the speakers’ ideologies
should have been coded; to the contrary, it is to highlight the
uncertainties that surround any effort to capture the justices’
own perceptions of ideologically nuanced cases.
Consider, first, the authors’ startling treatment of
Dawson v. Delaware.188 David Dawson, a convicted murderer
sitting on Delaware’s death row, alleged that the state had
violated his First Amendment rights during his sentencing
proceedings by allowing the prosecutor to tell the jury that
Dawson had the words “Aryan Brotherhood” tattooed on his
hand, that the Aryan Brotherhood was “a white racist prison
gang,” and that Dawson called himself “Abaddon,” by which
186. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
187. See Tajfel & Turner, supra note 25, at 40 (explaining that the groundwork
for in-group bias is laid when, among other things, there is “a collection of
individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category”)
(emphasis added).
188. 503 U.S. 159 (1992).
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he meant he was a disciple of Satan.189 Eight justices
concluded that Dawson’s First Amendment right to free
association had indeed been violated, then remanded for
harmless-error analysis.190 The authors counted those as
votes in favor of a conservative speaker.191 Calling himself one
of Satan’s disciples certainly did not land Dawson in the
conservative camp. Is the assumption here that a speaker’s
self-identification as a racist will, standing alone, signal to
the conservative justices that he “conforms to [those justices’
own] values”?192
In earlier versions of their paper, the authors revealed
that something along those lines was in fact their rationale,
stating that they coded “racist communication” and “racist
behavior” as conservative expression.193 There are additional
cases—a pair involving cross-burnings, for example—in
which the authors appear to have proceeded on the
assumption that conservative justices do indeed see racists
as members of their own ideological in-group.194 The authors
evidently regarded racism as a hallmark of conservative
justices’ in-group no matter what the race of the individual
who was behaving or speaking in a racist fashion. In one case,
189. Id. at 161-63.
190. See id. at 165-69.
191. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1927.
192. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3.
193. Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey A. Segal, Do Justices Defend
the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment 8
(Aug. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Epstein et al., 2013 Version] (on file with author),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300572 (“racist
communication”); Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker & Jeffrey Segal, Do
Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First
Amendment 7 (Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Epstein et al., 2012 Version] (on file
with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2107425 (“racist behavior”). In the examples of conservative expression that
the authors provide in the most recent version of their paper, racists have been
replaced by pro-life speakers. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10.
194. See, e.g., Codings, supra note 52, at line 1813 (coding as conservative the
teenager in R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), who allegedly burned
a cross in the yard of an African-American family); id. at line 3072 (coding as
conservative the individuals in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), who burned
crosses at a Ku Klux Klan rally and in the yard of an African-American man).
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for example—a case they foregrounded in earlier versions of
their paper—they coded as conservative an AfricanAmerican man whose sentence for aggravated battery had
been enhanced because he selected his victim (a young white
boy) on the basis of his race.195 The authors’ apparent belief
about what qualifies a person for in-group-member status in
the eyes of conservative justices is extraordinary. It is equally
extraordinary to suppose that, in Dawson, the speaker’s
racist self-identification would trump the fact that he was a
convicted murderer seeking invalidation of his capital
sentence—hardly the kind of litigant one imagines would
ordinarily draw a conservative justice’s bias-driven vote.196
We move to quite different territory in Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,197 where
the dispute concerned a particular kind of commercial
speech. United Reporting was a privately owned business
that gathered the names and addresses of recently arrested
individuals and then sold that information to insurers,
driving schools, drug and alcohol counselors, and lawyers. 198
A state statute required United Reporting and others
requesting arrested individuals’ addresses to declare that
they would not use the information for marketing purposes.199
The authors regarded United Reporting as a liberal
speaker.200 In other commercial-speech cases, however, the
study’s authors often classified the speakers as conservative
(a decision that some might question on a case-by-case basis).
Even more to the point, in another commercial-speech case
195. See id. at line 1881 (coding Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993));
Epstein et al., 2013 Version, supra note 193, at 8 & n.23 (citing Mitchell); Epstein
et al., 2012 Version, supra note 193, at 7 (citing Mitchell).
196. In many other cases, the authors classified prisoners as liberal. See, e.g.,
Codings, supra note 52, at line 3922 (coding as liberal the prisoner in Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), who challenged a prison restriction on inmate
correspondence); id. at line 3837 (coding as liberal the prisoner in Shaw v.
Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001), who wished to assist other inmates with legal
matters).
197. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
198. Id. at 34.
199. Id. at 34-35.
200. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3211.
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(Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.), the study’s authors were faced
with “data miners” in the business of gathering prescriberidentifying information from pharmacies and then selling
that information to pharmaceutical companies for use in
those companies’ marketing efforts.201 The authors coded
those data miners as conservative.202 Assuming that was a
fair classification, why not similarly code United Reporting
as a conservative data miner engaged in both producing and
facilitating commercial speech? 203
Some of the debatably classified cases involve the press.
In Florida Star v. B.J.F., for example, the Florida Star—a
weekly newspaper in Jacksonville, Florida—had violated a
state law by publishing the full name of a woman who had
been sexually assaulted.204 A jury awarded her damages,205
but a majority of the Court ruled that imposing liability on
the newspaper violated its First Amendment rights.206 The
authors coded the newspaper’s speech as conservative
because, in their view, keeping the identity of a survivor of
sexual assault private “is more of a liberal interest.”207 There
are good reasons to be skeptical about that decision. Do we
really think the Court’s conservatives perceive speech as
coming from one of their own when—indeed, because—that
speech is insensitive to a woman who has been sexually
assaulted? Moreover, the Florida Star is part of a media
industry that is widely perceived as tending toward the left
as a general matter, and the authors sometimes coded other
201. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2660 (2011).
202. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3882.
203. The authors have subsequently said they coded the case as they did
because some of the information was supplied “to groups that could provide
support to arrested individuals.” Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3949. But
couldn’t one just as easily say that some of the information was provided to profitseeking insurance companies and driving schools to increase their revenues? If
so, shouldn’t one confess that one really has no idea how the individual justices
themselves perceived the ideological tenor of the First Amendment claim?
204. 491 U.S. 524, 526-28 (1989).
205. Id. at 529.
206. Id. at 541.
207. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3349; see also Codings, supra note 52, at
line 1060.
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members of that industry accordingly.208 A number of media
organizations lined up behind the newspaper as amici curiae
(including, for example, the New York Times Company and
the American Newspaper Publishers Association),209 while
the conservative Pacific Legal Foundation filed an amicus
brief in support of the woman.210 The Florida Star, moreover,
is no ordinary newspaper. It was founded in 1951 by an
African-American journalist;211 it bills itself as “Northeast
Florida’s oldest African American-owned newspaper” and as
“committed to providing [readers] with the latest and most
accurate news possible that affects the African American
Community;”212 and it claims that “[m]ore African-Americans
turn to The Florida Star for their source of Black news than
any other media in North Central Florida and South
Georgia.”213 All things considered, can one really assume that
the justices saw the newspaper’s First Amendment claim as
emanating from a conservative enclave?
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.214 takes us from
newspapers to radio. Here, the speaker was a radio station
208. See, e.g., Lars Willnat & David H. Weaver, The American Journalist in the
Digital Age: Key Findings 11, IND. UNIV. BLOOMINGTON NEWSROOM, available at
http://news.indiana.edu/releases/iu/2014/05/2013-american-journalist-key-findin
gs.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (reporting that American journalists are far
more likely to identify themselves as Independents or Democrats than
Republicans); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3772 (coding as liberal the
newspaper in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), which had
published an allegedly defamatory story about a high-school wrestling coach).
209. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Association, the
New York Times Company, the Miami Herald Publishing Company, the Tribune
Company, the Times Herald Printing Company, McClatchey Newspapers, Inc.,
and the Florida First Amendment Foundation, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524
(1989) (No. 87-329).
210. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pacific Legal Foundation, in Support of
Appellee, Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (No. 87-329); see generally
EPSTEIN, supra note 157, at 171 (stating that the Pacific Legal Foundation was
“the first conservative public interest legal foundation”).
211. See About, FLA. STAR, http://www.thefloridastar.com/about-2 (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014).
212. Id.
213. Subscribe, FLA. STAR, http://www.thefloridastar.com/subscribe (last visited
Nov. 17, 2014).
214. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
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based in North Carolina that wished to air advertisements
for the Virginia lottery.215 North Carolina itself did not permit
lotteries, and a federal statute thus barred the station from
running the ads.216 The authors regarded the station as a
liberal speaker.217 In other cases, however, the authors
regarded speakers as conservative when they were radio and
television stations wishing to run advertisements for
casinos,218 liquor stores wishing to advertise their prices,219
and cigarette manufacturers and retailers wishing to
advertise their products.220 Assuming for the sake of
argument that the authors properly classified the radio and
television stations that wished to advertise casinos, as well
as the entities that wished to advertise liquor prices and
cigarettes (decisions with which one might disagree—after
all, don’t some social conservatives frown upon gambling,
drinking, and smoking?), why should we categorize as liberal
the radio station that wanted to advertise the Virginia
lottery? From my vantage point—but not from the study’s
authors’221—it is far from clear that there is a dispositive
difference between state-run lotteries and privately owned
casinos in the eyes of conservative and liberal justices who
are making in-group and out-group assessments of speakers’
ideological identities.
Recall that, in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri,222 a
unionized employee alleged that his employer had
unconstitutionally discriminated against him.223 The authors

215. See id. at 423-24.
216. See id. at 422-23.
217. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1825.
218. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173
(1999); Codings, supra note 52, at line 3764.
219. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996); Codings,
supra note 52, at line 3774.
220. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Codings, supra
note 52, at line 3776.
221. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3679.
222. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011).
223. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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determined that the employee was a liberal speaker.224 If
Guarnieri’s union-member status were the only known fact
about him, one likely would accept the authors’ classification.
This particular speaker, however, was the town’s chief of
police.225 Coming to his defense as amici curiae were the
National Fraternal Order of Police, the National Troopers
Coalition, and the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association,
who argued (among other things) that “[b]ecause of the
higher standard to which police officers are held and the
resulting political and media pressure which comes to bear,
police officers are uniquely vulnerable to politically
motivated, arbitrary and retaliatory employment action.”226
With police officers and their interests so squarely in the
picture, can one confidently say that a conservative justice
would see Guarnieri as a member of the opposing ideological
team? In their discussion of a different case—Garcetti v.
Ceballos227—Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal write that
in-group biases may have prompted conservative justices to
be hostile to the claims of a speaker who “was a whistle
blower (and one who blew his whistle on a law enforcement
officer no less!).”228 That emphatic reference to the fact that
someone took actions adverse to a law-enforcement officer
suggests that a conservative justice might look on Chief of
Police Guarnieri with ideological affection. What reason do
we have to believe that, for the justices, law enforcement
officers switch ideological teams when they join a union or
sue their employers for retaliation?
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association is also
questionably classified.229 Under the governorship of Arnold
Schwarzenegger, California adopted legislation making it
224. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4455.
225. See Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2492.
226. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Fraternal Order of Police, the National
Troopers Coalition & the Pennsylvania State Troopers Association in Support of
Respondent at 7, Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (No. 091476).
227. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
228. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 7.
229. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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illegal to rent or sell “violent video games” to minors.230 The
legislation defined such games as those
“in which the range of options available to a player includes killing,
maiming, dismembering, or sexually assaulting an image of a
human being, if those acts are depicted” in a manner that “[a]
reasonable person, considering the game as a whole, would find
appeals to a deviant or morbid interest of minors,” that is “patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors,” and that “causes the game, as a whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.”231

The statute’s drafters plainly tracked the famous language
that—over the dissents of liberal justices—Chief Justice
Burger and a majority of the Court had used when defining
constitutionally unprotected obscenity in Miller v.
California.232 The Entertainment Merchants Association and
the Entertainment Software Association (makers and sellers
of video games) argued that the statute violated their First
Amendment rights.233 Governor Schwarzenegger and
230. Id. at 2732 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1746-1746.5 (West 2014)).
231. Id. at 2732-33 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1746(d)(1)(A) (West 2014)).
232. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”) (internal
quotation and citations omitted).
233. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2733. The ESA represents
businesses both huge and small. See ESA Members, ESA, http:/www.theesa.com/
about/members.asp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). As profit-seeking companies, one
might think of many of them as conservative. As entities pushing entertainment
to minors with content that might conflict with the values of those children’s
parents, one might think of many of them as liberal. According to one analysis,
the ESA in the late 2000s divided its campaign contributions almost evenly
between Republicans and Democrats. See Jennifer M. Profitt & Margaret A.
Susca, Follow the Money: The Entertainment Software Association Attack on
Video Game Regulation 18, available at http://www.academia.edu/2021684/
Follow_the_Money_The_Entertainment_Software_Association_Attack_on_Video
_Game_Regulation (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). As for the EMA, it supports
policies one might associate both with the left (resisting “restrictions on adult
content” and allowing the sale and rental of “lawfully made copies without
restraint”) and the right (supporting “laws against video piracy”). See EMA’s
Public Policy Priorities, ENTMERCH, http://www.entmerch.org/government-
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Attorney General Jerry Brown filed the brief on the merits
defending the law,234 and then the case acquired Brown’s
name after he became California’s next governor. Justice
Scalia wrote for a majority of the Court, striking down the
California law on First Amendment grounds.235 Justice Alito
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Chief
Justice Roberts joined it.236 The authors coded those as votes
for conservative speakers.237
Bearing in mind that the justices’ own perceptions are
what matter in a study of in-group bias, how does that
classification fare? California’s lawmakers had closely
tracked the definition of obscenity that a conservative justice
provided (and liberal justices resisted) in Miller, and the
study’s authors classified those who produced obscene speech
as liberal.238 In debates about the content of television shows,
movies, and other forms of entertainment media,
conservatives commonly make the case for decency and
restraint, while liberals commonly make the case for free
expression.239 When it comes to seeking removal of
controversial content from the children’s section of libraries,
conservatives have hardly been passive.240 It may be true that
relations/public-policy-priorities.html#.U-TcJqAo6M8 (last visited Nov. 17,
2014).
234. Petitioners’ Brief, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)
(No. 08-1448).
235. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2742 (“Legislation such as
this . . . cannot survive strict scrutiny.”).
236. Id. (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I . . . agree with the Court that
this particular law cannot be sustained. I disagree, however, with the approach
taken in the Court’s opinion.”).
237. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4465 (Roberts); id. at line 4497 (Alito).
238. See, e.g., id. at line 372 (coding Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
239. The memorable activism of Tipper Gore, a prominent Democrat, against
violent and sexually explicit lyrics stands as a reminder that one cannot make
universally applicable generalizations about liberals’ and conservatives’ wishes
and behavior. See Tipper Gore Widens War on Rock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1988, at
C18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/04/arts/tipper-gore-widenswar-on-rock.html. Or perhaps it is a mistake to think that people ordinarily can
be classified in a binary fashion in the first place.
240. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856-58 (1982) (describing a
school board’s efforts to remove controversial books from school libraries following
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conservatives sometimes are more tolerant of violent
entertainment and that liberals sometimes are more tolerant
of sexual entertainment.241 But such a neat line is difficult to
draw here; indeed, there are signs that this is not the line
along which conservatives and liberals divided in this
particular instance. The conservative Eagle Forum
Education and Legal Defense Fund was among those who
filed an amicus brief in support of the restrictive California
law,242 for example, while the National Coalition Against
Censorship, which formed in response to the Court’s 1973
anti-obscenity ruling in Miller,243 was among the many freespeech-favoring organizations that filed an amicus brief
against it.244 Perhaps the speakers and speech in
Entertainment Merchants Association are too ideologically
indeterminate to classify. If pressed to place them in one
camp or the other, however, I suspect many would join me in
designating them as tending toward the left.
A different sort of question clouds the authors’ handling
of Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association.245 The authors
usually classified employees who resisted unions as
conservative,246 but they decided to classify the uniona meeting with “a politically conservative organization of parents”); see generally
Robert P. Doyle, Books Challenged or Banned in 2010-2011, available at
http://www.ila.org/BannedBooks/BBW_Short_List_2010-2011_Single_R5.pdf
(listing some of the library books to which objections were raised between May
2010 and May 2011, the time period in which Entertainment Merchants
Association was before the Court).
241. That is the basis on which the authors have tried to justify their coding of
the case. See Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 4503.
242. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund
in Support of Petitioners, Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)
(No. 08-1448).
243. See About Us, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST CENSORSHIP, http://ncac.org/about-us
(last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
244. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union, the National
Coalition Against Censorship and the National Youth Rights Association for the
Respondents at 5-8. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (No.
08-1448).
245. 500 U.S. 507 (1991).
246. See, e.g., Codings, supra note 52, at line 3384 (classifying as conservative
the dissenting employees in Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009)).
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resisting employees in Lehnert as liberal.247 The authors have
since explained that they coded the case as they did because
this was (they believed) a case of “union members vs. union
leadership.”248 Unfortunately, the authors are confused about
the facts. The employees were not union members—rather,
they were dissenting employees who contributed to the union
only because they were required to do so by force of law. 249
And even if the authors had accurately applied their own
coding criteria, one could still ask whether it was the
employees’ status as faculty members (sometimes seen as
tending toward the ideological left) or their status as union
resisters that predominated in the eyes of the justices.
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC250 shifts our
attention from a state college to the Ivy League. Rosalie
Tung—an associate professor at the University of
Pennsylvania—filed a complaint against the school, alleging
that it discriminated against her on the basis of her race, sex,
and national origin when it denied her application for
tenure.251 Citing First Amendment principles of academic
freedom, the university refused to give the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission the unredacted
tenure files of the plaintiff and of five male faculty members
whom the plaintiff said had received more favorable
treatment.252 The justices unanimously rejected the
university’s argument, and the authors tallied those as votes
against a liberal speaker.253 In many settings, universities
and claims of academic freedom surely do have liberal
overtones. But that line of thinking is plainly problematic
here, where the university’s First Amendment claim centered
on the fact that the university was resisting the EEOC’s
247. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1849.
248. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3520.
249. See Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 511-13; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 3,
Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (No. 89-1217) (“Petitioners
(‘the nonmembers’) are . . . not union members . . . .”).
250. 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
251. Id. at 185.
252. Id. at 185-86.
253. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1107.
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effort to investigate a minority female’s allegations of
employment discrimination.254
The Court’s ruling in City of Dallas v. Stanglin255
concerned a dance hall catering to older children. Responding
to demand for dance venues where children could safely go,
the City of Dallas had adopted an ordinance under which
business owners could obtain a license to run a dance hall to
which only children between the ages of fourteen and
eighteen could be admitted (making exceptions for parents,
guardians, dance-hall employees, and law enforcement
personnel).256 Charles Stanglin, the owner of the Twilight
Skating Rink, obtained one of the licenses and then divided
his skating rink in half, with one side devoted to skating and
the other devoted to dancing by children within the
designated ages.257 Stanglin then challenged the ordinance’s
age restriction, arguing that it violated the First Amendment
associational rights of children who wished to spend time
with individuals outside the designated age range.258 For all
nine justices, the focus was on the children, not on Stanglin
(who did not assert a First Amendment claim of his own).259
Specifically, the justices focused on the claim that teenagers
congregating at a dance hall are engaged in an associational
activity protected by the Constitution.260 The authors
regarded the speakers as liberal.261 Yet it is not apparent why
a liberal justice would personally regard those teenagers as
ideological allies by virtue of the teenagers’ desire to spend
254. See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 188. For a discussion of the authors’
problematic handling of instances in which a speaker ordinarily associated with
one ideological camp produces speech that is ordinarily associated with the other,
see infra Part II.E.
255. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
256. See id. at 21-22.
257. Id. at 22.
258. Id.
259. See Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19
(1989) (No. 87-1848).
260. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25; id. at 28 (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment). The Court also evaluated the case under the Equal Protection Clause
because it involved an age-based classification. Id. at 25-28 (majority opinion).
261. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 1277.
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time with people over the age of eighteen, nor is it apparent
why a conservative justice would regard those teenagers as
members of the “opposing ideological team.”262
The authors coded personal-injury and foreclosure
attorneys who wished to send direct-mail solicitations to
potential clients as liberal,263 while coding a Certified Public
Accountant who wished to do the same thing as
conservative.264 (By the way, one cannot easily reconcile the
authors’ coding of those personal-injury and foreclosure
attorneys with their decision to classify as conservative a
trial attorney who wished to state on his letterhead that he
was a “certified civil trial specialist.”265) Let us suppose those
are accurate classifications. What should one do when
presented with an attorney who holds accounting
credentials? In Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business and
Professional Regulation,266 Silvia Ibanez—a Florida attorney
who handles a broad range of matters267—ran into ethics
problems with the Florida Board of Accountancy (the Board)
when she placed the letters “CPA” and “CFP” next to her
name in her telephone-book listing, on her business cards,
and on her business stationery.268 Those acronyms indicated
that she was credentialed as a Certified Public Accountant
and Certified Financial Planner. The Board brought charges
against her for (among other things) practicing public
accounting in an unlicensed firm.269 Ibanez contended that
262. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16.
263. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 3166 (coding Florida Bar v. Went for It,
515 U.S. 618 (1995), concerning personal-injury attorneys); id. at line 1176
(coding Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988), concerning a
foreclosure attorney).
264. See id. at line 2029 (coding Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)).
265. Peel v. Att’y Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n of Ill., 496 U.S. 91, 96-97
(1990); Codings, supra note 52, at line 1201.
266. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
267. See SILVIA S. IBANEZ, PLC, http://ibanezlaw.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
I have not been able to locate a record of Ibanez’s practice areas during the
relevant period twenty years ago. Today, she handles estate planning, smallbusiness consulting, guardianships, wrongful deaths, and other matters.
268. Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 138.
269. See id. at 138-42.
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she was practicing law, not public accounting, and that her
use of the two acronyms was constitutionally protected
commercial speech.270 The authors regarded her as a
conservative speaker.271 Even if it generally is true that
lawyers lean to the left and CPAs lean to the right, by what
means can one reliably determine which of those specialties
trumps the other in the eyes of the justices when a litigant
has feet planted in both worlds? By saying that she practiced
law, not accounting, Ibanez herself indicated that her
primary professional identity was as an attorney. The
Florida Bar filed an amicus brief in support of Ibanez,272 while
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants filed
an amicus brief against her.273
The authors have since indicated that they categorized
Ibanez as conservative because the case involved “regulating
commercial speech in the name of preventing fraud.”274
Suppose one finds that reasoning persuasive. One still has
reason to wonder whether some of the justices made their ingroup assessments on entirely different grounds, such as the
fact that Ibanez was a minority female trying to launch her
own business.275 All things considered, can we be sure that
the conservative justices regarded Ibanez as ideologically one
of their own and that liberal justices did not?
E. Disregarding the Problems that Arise When the
Ideologies of Speakers’ Speech and Usual Identities
Diverge

270. See id. at 142-43.
271. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 2729.
272. See Brief of Amicus Curiae The Florida Bar in Support of Petitioner, Ibanez
v. Fla. Dep’t Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (No. 93-639).
273. See Brief of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t Bus. & Prof’l
Regulation, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (No. 93-639).
274. Appendix C, supra note 57, at line 3715.
275. In another fraud-focused case, for example, the authors themselves appear
to have focused on the usual ideological affiliation of the speaker, rather than on
the ideological quality of the speech. See infra Part II.E (discussing Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010)).
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As I noted when discussing Washington State Grange in
Part I.C,276 capturing the justices’ own ideological in-group
and out-group assessments of First Amendment litigants
takes on an added layer of complexity when people do not
speak in ways that accord with their usual ideological
identities. Numerous cases in the authors’ study illustrate
the problem; I describe several of them in the appended
footnote.277 Consider, for example, the authors’ handling of
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.278 In that
case, a law firm argued that the First Amendment shielded
it from being forced to comply with certain provisions of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005.279 Specifically, the firm objected to two ways in which
the legislation regulates entities that provide bankruptcy
assistance to consumer debtors: the statute restricts those
entities’ ability to advise clients to incur additional debt prior
to filing for bankruptcy,280 and it compels those entities to
make clear in advertisements and certain other
communications that they are in the business of helping
276. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
277. See, e.g., supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text (discussing the
authors’ handling of University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990));
see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 535 U.S.
150 (2002) (concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses who wanted to distribute Bibles and
other religious literature in door-to-door encounters), for which the authors coded
the speakers as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 3058; Riley v. Nat’l
Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (concerning professional fundraisers who
objected to state limits on the fees they could charge), for which the authors coded
the speakers as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 1234; Ark. Writers’
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987) (concerning a general-interest
magazine’s opposition to a state sales tax), for which the authors coded the
speaker as liberal, see Codings, supra note 52, at line 1037. This problem of
divergence also helps to illustrate—but not resolve—the confusion surrounding
cases in which the authors coded the Democratic Party as conservative or the
Republican Party as liberal due to the First Amendment claims they advanced.
See, e.g., supra notes 51-60, 125-42 and accompanying text. When a political party
with one prevailing ideological affiliation produces speech that might be
associated with the opposing ideological team, how can we know how an
opportunistic, bias-driven justice perceived the prevailing ideological tenor of the
case?
278. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
279. See id. at 231-34 (describing the law firm’s claims).
280. See 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2012).
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people file for bankruptcy.281 The latter restriction is aimed
at preventing the entities from misleadingly advertising that
they can help individuals obtain debt relief without having to
go through the pains of bankruptcy.282 A majority of the
Court—including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—
rejected the law firm’s constitutional claims, and the authors
counted those as votes against a liberal speaker.283
Did this case really come to the Court from the liberal
ideological team? The question is difficult to answer because
the case presents a complication: how should one classify a
case in which the speaker might usually be regarded as
liberal but a significant portion of the speech is likely
conservative, or vice versa? The study’s authors creep up to
the edge of that question—stating, for example, that “the four
most conservative Justices are significantly more likely to
support the free-expression claim when the speaker is
conservative (or espousing a conservative message) than
when the speaker is liberal”284—but they do not squarely
confront it.285 The title of their study declares that they are
examining
whether
justices
defend
“speech”—not
“speakers”—that they “hate,”286 while at various places
within their text the authors indicate they are focusing on

281. See id. §§ 528(a), (b)(2).
282. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250 (explaining that the statute’s “required
disclosures are intended to combat the problem of inherently misleading
commercial advertisements—specifically, the promise of debt relief without any
reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs”).
283. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4470 (Roberts); id. at line 4502 (Alito).
284. Summary, supra note 6, at 4 (emphasis added).
285. Cf. PAUL M. COLLINS, JR., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST
GROUPS AND JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 50 (2008) (discussing research that
tended to show that the Supreme Court heard from conservative groups more
frequently than commonly supposed, and stating that the value of this research
was “limited” because the authors “did not categorize the ideological orientations
of the group’s positions on a case by case basis but instead classified organizations
[based upon more general criteria]”) (emphasis in original).
286. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1; cf. id. at 13 (stating that “conservative
justices are less likely to support liberal speech than they are to support
conservative speech”).
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the ideological identities of the speakers themselves.287 In the
chart they prepared for the New York Times, the study’s
authors conflated the two, providing one column labeled
“Liberal
Speakers/Speech”
and
another
labeled
“Conservative Speakers/Speech.”288 When presented with a
case in which the ideologies of the speaker and the speech
diverge, which of the two trumps the other for purposes of
determining whether a justice is ideologically biased in favor
of a First Amendment claimant?
Milavetz illustrates the difficulty. The speakers in that
case were the law firm, its president, and one of its
bankruptcy attorneys. One could fairly contend that
consumer-bankruptcy attorneys as a whole tend toward the
ideological left, and a glance at the Milavetz firm’s website—
which states that the firm’s “key practice areas” are personalinjury, vehicle accidents, bankruptcy, and family law289—
might lead one to assume that at least some of the firm’s
attorneys tend toward the left, as well. On the other hand,
one of the key issues in the case concerned the government’s
effort to force profit-seeking entities like the Milavetz firm to
make specified disclosures in their advertising, lest
economically disadvantaged consumers be misled. It seems
highly unlikely that the law firm’s resistance to that
compelled speech would strike the justices as liberal in
nature. As one of the study’s authors has noted elsewhere,
liberals typically champion the cause of consumers, not the
businesses with whom those consumers deal.290 Indeed, four
consumer-protection entities commonly associated with leftleaning causes joined together in filing an amicus brief in
support of the Government’s position on the issue, arguing
287. See, e.g., id. at 2 (“[T]he justices’ votes tend to reflect their preferences
toward the speakers’ ideological grouping.”).
288. See Summary, supra note 6, at 5; supra Table A.
289. MILAVETZ, GALLOP & MILAVETZ, P.A., http://www.milavetzlaw.com (last
visited Nov. 17, 2014).
290. See Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, The Rise of Conservative Interest
Group Litigation, 45 J. POL. 479, 480 (1983) (labeling interest groups as “liberal”
if they typically represent “the interests of minorities, criminal defendants, or
consumers” and as “conservative” if they typically represent “the interests of
employers and business”).
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that “[e]ven a brief sampling of the myriad disclosure regimes
upon which much of the nation’s economic activity relies
illustrates the critical importance of maintaining a
deferential level of First Amendment review for laws
requiring factual commercial disclosures.”291 With the firm
itself possibly tending toward the left and one of the firm’s
chief speech claims possibly tending toward the right, one
cannot reliably say that an ideologically motivated justice is
likely to see the speaker and the speech in Milavetz as both
being either conservative or liberal. Without knowing
whether the speaker or the speech is preeminent in the eyes
of an ideologically opportunistic justice, the case is an
unreliable basis for assessing justices’ in-group biases.
F. The Possibility of Unclaimed Speakers
There are some cases in which one finds speakers whom
it is difficult to believe any justice would perceive as a valuessharing, ideological in-group member. We already
encountered such speakers in Dawson and other cases
featuring racist expression.292 Is it plausible to believe that
any justice today would regard as a values-sharing
ideological teammate a man who trumpets his membership
in the Aryan Brotherhood, or chooses his young assault
victim on the basis of the boy’s race, or burns crosses at a
KKK rally or in the yard of an African-American family?
There are additional speakers in the study whom one
assumes no justice would perceive as an ideological ally.
Consider, for example, United States v. Williams.293 “[U]sing
a sexually explicit screen name,” Michael Williams entered
an Internet chat room and declared that he had “good pics”
of himself with his daughter, that he wanted to swap them
for other “toddler pics,” and that he possessed photographs of

291. See Brief of Public Good, the Center for Science in the Public Interest, the
Environmental Law Foundation, and the Center for Environmental Health as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent United States at 30, Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (Nos. 08-1119, 08-1225).
292. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text.
293. 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
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his four-year-old daughter being molested by other men.294 He
subsequently provided a hyperlink to “seven pictures of
actual children, aged approximately 5 to 15, engaging in
sexually explicit conduct and displaying their genitals.”295
When federal officials later searched his home, agents found
“two hard drives containing at least 22 images of real
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, some of it
sadomasochistic.”296 When charged with pandering child
pornography in violation of federal law, he argued that the
statute at issue was vague and overbroad and that his
prosecution thus violated the First Amendment.297 Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both joined Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion rejecting Williams’s claims.298 The authors
tallied those as votes against a liberal speaker.299
Acknowledging that it typically is those on the ideological
left who tend to press sexually oriented speech to its legal
limits, are we really willing to say that, when it comes to a
father pandering photographs of men molesting his fouryear-old daughter, conservatives “hate” the speech more than
liberals, or that liberal justices are likely to see the speaker
as an ideological teammate—as one who “conforms to [the
justices’ own] values”—and to “engage in opportunistic
behavior following from litigant favoritism”?300 Some leftleaning justices have certainly argued that adults ought to be
able to make their own expressive choices in the realm of
adult, consensual obscenity,301 and some justices have found
294. Id. at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 291-92.
297. See id. at 289-306.
298. See id. at 287.
299. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4466 (Roberts); id. at line 4499 (Alito).
300. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 1, 3, 6.
301. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 112-13 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile I cannot say that the interests of the State—
apart from the question of juveniles and unconsenting adults—are trivial or
nonexistent, I am compelled to conclude that these interests cannot justify the
substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation’s judicial
machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the distribution even
of unprotected material to consenting adults.”).
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a First Amendment right to possess and distribute nonobscene yet sexually explicit computer-generated images of
children.302 But no jurist has argued that adults ought to be
left free to make their own expressive choices in the realm of
pornography that involves the sexual exploitation of toddlers.
This surely is speech that all justices “hate.” As Justice
Kennedy put it in a 2002 opinion joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, “[t]he sexual abuse of a child
is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral
instincts of a decent people.”303 To the extent one aims to
determine whether justices have an in-group bias in favor of
ideologically likeminded speakers and a corresponding
antipathy to speakers who belong to the opposing ideological
team, I would have thought that Williams is best left on the
sidelines.
It is similarly difficult to imagine any justice regarding
the speakers in Snyder v. Phelps304 as ideological teammates
worthy of opportunistic favoritism. The First Amendment
claimants in that case were Fred Phelps and other members
of the infamous Westboro Baptist Church.305 At a funeral for
a United States Marine who was killed while serving in Iraq,
Phelps and some of his fellow parishioners gathered near the
site of the funeral and held signs carrying such messages as
“‘God Hates the USA/Thank God for 9/11,’ ‘America is
Doomed,’ ‘Don’t Pray for the USA,’ ‘Thank God for IEDs,’
‘Thank God for Dead Soldiers,’ ‘Pope in Hell,’ ‘Priests Rape
Boys,’ ‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going to Hell,’ and ‘God
Hates You.’”306 When the Marine’s father brought a variety of
tort claims against Phelps and the church, those speakers
raised the First Amendment as a defense.307 Led by Chief

302. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246-51 (2002).
303. Id. at 244.
304. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
305. Id. at 1213.
306. Id.
307. See id. at 1214.
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Justice Roberts, the Court ruled in the speakers’ favor,308 with
Justice Alito filing a lone dissent.309 The authors coded those
as votes, respectively, for and against conservative
speakers.310
Does it indeed seem likely that the conservative justices
saw Phelps and the other Westboro Baptist picketers as
values-sharing ideological allies? That seems like an
untenable assumption when one considers how the picketers
framed their anti-homosexuality message—in language
condemning the United States and celebrating the deaths of
American soldiers, objects of patriotism to which
conservatives certainly cede nothing to liberals in the degree
of their attachment. As Chief Justice Roberts gently put it in
his closing remarks, “Westboro believes that America is
morally flawed; many Americans might feel the same about
Westboro.”311
G. Handling Litigants’ Successive Appearances
Suppose a litigant appears before the Court twice in close
succession concerning the same set of legal issues during the
course of a single lawsuit. If a justice votes for the litigant on
both occasions, does one have twice as much evidence of bias
in favor of that litigant’s ideological team as one would have
if the litigant had appeared only once?
In a dispute with the Federal Election Commission
concerning corporations’ First Amendment freedom to
produce political speech, Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., came
to the Court twice in successive Terms—first to argue that
the district court’s dismissal of its claim was founded upon
an erroneous reading of the Court’s campaign-finance
308. See id. at 1220 (“As a Nation we have chosen . . . to protect even hurtful
speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice
requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”).
309. See id. at 1229 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[Phelps’s and the church’s]
outrageous conduct caused [the father] great injury, and the Court now
compounds that injury by depriving [the father] of a judgment that acknowledges
the wrong he suffered.”).
310. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4453 (Roberts); id. at line 4496 (Alito).
311. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1220.
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precedent,312 and then again the following year when the FEC
challenged the district court’s ruling in favor of Wisconsin
Right to Life on the merits.313 On both occasions, Chief Justice
Roberts sided with Wisconsin Right to Life. The authors
coded those as two separate instances in which he voted in
favor of conservative speakers.314
Treating a justice’s successive encounters with the same
speaker in the same litigation as if they were encounters with
different litigants in different cases is problematic because it
raises questions about whether the variables are as
independent of one another as their separate treatment
presupposes. Both of the Wisconsin Right to Life cases
concerned the same speaker, wishing to produce the same
political speech, running up against the same body of federal
regulation, litigating against the same governmental entity
during the course of the same lawsuit. If Wisconsin Right to
Life had returned to the Court five times during the lifespan
of that litigation, would we confidently count those
appearances as five separate data points for assessing the
justices’ susceptibility to ideological in-group bias? If not, we
probably should not count them even twice.
III. REASSESSING THE EVIDENCE OF BIAS: JUSTICE ALITO AND
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS
What do these sorts of difficulties mean for the authors’
bottom-line assessments of individual justices? Because
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts cast the fewest
number of votes of all the Roberts Court justices in the study,
one can readily assess their voting histories for oneself. For
each of those two conservatives, Professors Epstein, Parker,
and Segal concluded there was a wide, statistically
significant disparity in his support for conservative and
liberal speakers.315 As I indicated above in Table A, the
312. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
313. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
314. See Codings, supra note 52, at line 4463; id. at line 4468.
315. Although those two justices’ votes were sufficiently numerous to generate
a finding of a statistically significant disparity, the authors found that they could
not “estimate the full statistical model for” those two justices because they had
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authors found that liberal speakers won Justice Alito’s vote
in only 9.1% of the cases in which they appeared, while
conservatives comparatively flourished with a success rate of
53.9%. For Chief Justice Roberts, those numbers were
similarly skewed, with liberals and conservatives securing
his vote 15.4% and 64.3% of the time, respectively.316 The
evidence does not support those dramatic findings.
The authors identified 24 free-expression cases in which
Justice Alito cast votes during the study’s time period.317 Of
those 24 cases, the authors classified 13 as involving
conservative speakers and 11 as involving liberal speakers.
Chief Justice Roberts cast votes in 27 free-expression cases
within the study, with conservatives and liberals appearing
in 14 and 13 of those cases (in the authors’ judgment),
respectively. Placed into those two groupings, here are the
cases, together with the authors’ determination of whether
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts voted for or against
the speakers.
Authors’ Coding
of Alito’s Vote

Authors’ Coding
of Roberts’s Vote

For Speaker

For Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n
v. Brentwood Acad.320

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

United States v. Stevens321

Against Speaker

For Speaker

Case
Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC318
Locke v. Karass

319

not cast votes in a sufficiently large number of cases. See Summary, supra note 6,
at 4-5 & n.5.
316. See supra Table A.
317. See Codings, supra note 52, at lines 4480-503.
318. 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (concerning corporate expenditures on political
speech); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4480 (Alito); id. at line 4473 (Roberts).
319. 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (concerning the speech of nonunion employees); see
Codings, supra note 52, at line 4481 (Alito); id. at line 4474 (Roberts).
320. 551 U.S. 291 (2007) (concerning the football-recruiting speech of a private
high school); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4482 (Alito); id. at line 4467
(Roberts).
321. 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (concerning video recordings of animal-on-animal
violence); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4485 (Alito); id. at line 4477
(Roberts).
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Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan322

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party323

For Speaker

Against Speaker

FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.324

For Speaker

For Speaker

Doe v. Reed325

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.326

For Speaker

For Speaker

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett327

For Speaker

For Speaker

Randall v. Sorrell328

For Speaker

For Speaker

Against Speaker

For Speaker

For Speaker

For Speaker

N/A

For Speaker

Snyder v. Phelps

329

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n

330

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC331

Table B: Speakers Classified by the Authors as Conservative

322. 131 S. Ct. 2343 (2011) (concerning a city council member’s vote on a realestate development proposal); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4486 (Alito); id.
at line 4469 (Roberts).
323. 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (discussed supra Part I.C); see Codings, supra note 52,
at line 4487 (Alito); id. at line 4457 (Roberts).
324. 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (discussed supra Part II.G); see Codings, supra note 52,
at line 4490 (Alito); id. at line 4463 (Roberts).
325. 561 U.S. 186 (2010) (concerning the rights of individuals opposed to samesex marriage); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4491 (Alito); id. at line 4461
(Roberts).
326. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (concerning pharmacies’ and data miners’ right to
provide information to pharmaceuticals for marketing purposes); see Codings,
supra note 52, at line 4493 (Alito); id. at line 4476 (Roberts).
327. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (concerning Republican politicians’ objection to a
state’s campaign-finance system); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4494 (Alito);
id. at line 4454 (Roberts).
328. 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (concerning Republican politicians’ objection to limits
on campaign contributions and expenditures); see Codings, supra note 52, at line
4495 (Alito); id. at line 4464 (Roberts).
329. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (concerning an anti-homosexuality protest at a
military funeral) (discussed supra Part II.F); see Codings, supra note 52, at line
4496 (Alito); id. at line 4453 (Roberts).
330. 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (discussed supra at notes 229-44); see Codings, supra
note 52, at line 4497 (Alito); id. at line 4465 (Roberts).
331. 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (discussed supra Part II.G); see Codings, supra note 52,
at line 4468 (Roberts).
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Case

Authors’ Coding
of Alito’s Vote

Authors’ Coding
of Roberts’s Vote

Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project332

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez
Torres333

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass’n334

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

For Speaker

For Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Davis v. FEC

335

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
Morse v. Frederick

336

337

United States v. Williams338
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n
Garcetti v. Ceballos

340

339

332. 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (concerning the provision of aid for the humanitarian
functions of terrorist organizations); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4483
(Alito); id. at line 4460 (Roberts).
333. 552 U.S. 196 (2008) (discussed supra at notes 125-31); see Codings, supra
note 52, at line 4484 (Alito); id. at line 4456 (Roberts).
334. 551 U.S. 177 (2007) (concerning the consent a union must obtain to use
employees’ fees for political and ideological purposes); see Codings, supra note 52,
at line 4488 (Alito); id. at line 4478 (Roberts).
335. 554 U.S. 724 (2008) (concerning a Democratic politician’s objection to a
state’s campaign-finance system); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4489 (Alito);
id. at line 4472 (Roberts).
336. 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (concerning a nontraditional religion’s effort to erect a
permanent display in a city park); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4492 (Alito);
id. at line 4458 (Roberts).
337. 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (concerning a student’s display of an apparently prodrug message); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4498 (Alito); id. at line 4479
(Roberts).
338. 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (discussed supra at notes 293-303); see Codings, supra
note 52, at line 4499 (Alito); id. at line 4466 (Roberts).
339. 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (concerning a union’s objection to a state law limiting
payroll deductions to fund the union’s political activities); see Codings, supra note
52, at line 4500 (Alito); id. at line 4475 (Roberts).
340. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (concerning a whistleblower employee’s adverse
treatment by his state employer); see Codings, supra note 52, at line 4501 (Alito);
id. at line 4459 (Roberts).
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Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States341

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri342

Against Speaker

Against Speaker

N/A

For Speaker

N/A

Against Speaker

Beard v. Banks

343

Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic &
Institutional Rights, Inc.344

Table C: Speakers Classified by the Authors as Liberal

At first blush, the evidence of Justice Alito’s ideological
in-group bias appears strong. For reasons I have identified,
however, the authors’ handling of some of the relevant cases
is problematic. The authors likely erred when they
simplistically classified New York State Board of Elections v.
Lopez Torres as a case involving liberal speech.345 They
categorized Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States as a
case involving a liberal speaker, even though one of the law
firm’s central speech claims was of a sort commonly
associated with conservatives.346 They categorized the
speaker in United States v. Williams as liberal, even though
there is no basis for believing that liberals look more
tolerantly than conservatives on a father pandering
photographs of other men sexually abusing his young
daughter, and they categorized the speakers in Synder v.
Phelps as conservative, even though there is no basis for
believing that conservative justices would look preferentially
upon speakers who celebrate terrorist attacks and the deaths
of American soldiers.347 They categorized Borough of Duryea
341. 559 U.S. 229 (2010) (discussed supra Part II.E); see Codings, supra note 52,
at line 4502 (Alito); id. at line 4470 (Roberts).
342. 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (discussed supra at notes 111-18, 222-28); see
Codings, supra note 52, at line 4503 (Alito); id. at line 4455 (Roberts).
343. 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (discussed supra at notes 88-95); see Codings, supra
note 52, at line 4471 (Roberts).
344. 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (concerning law schools’ objection to hosting military
recruiters with policies adverse to homosexuality); see Codings, supra note 52, at
line 4462 (Roberts).
345. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part II.E.
347. See supra Part II.F.
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v. Guarnieri as a case involving a liberal speaker, even
though there is reason to suppose that conservative justices
might have looked favorably upon the chief of police who was
claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights.348 They
categorized the videogame makers and sellers in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association as conservative, even
though noteworthy ideological conservatives lined up to
defend the speech-restricting California law and noteworthy
ideological liberals lined up to support the purveyors of
controversial entertainment.349 And the authors erred twice
in their handling of Washington State Grange v. Washington
State Republican Party, first by simplistically coding the case
as involving conservative speech, and then by coding Justice
Alito as voting in the speakers’ favor.350
How would Justice Alito’s voting record appear if we
removed Lopez Torres, Milavetz, Williams, Snyder,
Guarnieri, and Washington State Grange as not reliably
probative on the issue of justices’ in-group biases, and moved
Entertainment Merchants Association to the liberal-speaker
side of the balance sheet? The gap between his support for
conservative and liberal speakers would narrow to a
difference of 50% support for the ten conservatives and 25%
for the eight liberals. The numbers with which we now are
dealing are so small that the raw difference is not
statistically significant. And even those raw numbers might
not be what they seem. Might anything other than in-group
bias account for the remaining apparent difference?
Take a look at Justice Alito’s votes in cases involving
campaign finance. There are five such cases—four in the
conservative camp (Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC; FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.; Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett; and Randall v. Sorrell) and
one in the liberal camp (Davis v. FEC). In each of those five
cases, Justice Alito voted in favor of the speaker. Some might
explain that consistent voting pattern by suggesting that
Justice Alito believes campaign-finance restrictions
disadvantage Republicans, and so he takes any chance he
348. See supra notes 111-18, 222-28 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
350. See supra Part I.C.
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gets to hold such restrictions unconstitutional, even when—
as in Davis—the immediate beneficiary is a Democrat.
Justice Alito himself would surely say he has a nonpartisan
view of political speech and the First Amendment, and this
view renders campaign-finance restrictions especially
vulnerable to constitutional attacks, no matter whom those
restrictions benefit or burden in a given case. If one brackets
that disagreement about the campaign-finance cases for a
moment and looks at the balance of Justice Alito’s record, one
finds there is virtually no raw difference at all in his support
for conservative and liberal speakers in the tiny number of
remaining cases, with votes for conservatives in 1 of 6 cases
and votes for liberals in 1 of 7. It is the campaign-finance
cases, in other words, that drive the seeming disparity in his
voting record—and when a Democrat appeared before him in
a campaign-finance case, that speaker won Justice Alito’s
vote.
After accounting for the problems in the authors’
handling of Chief Justice Roberts’ voting record, one finds
that the campaign-finance cases again play a powerful role.
The authors found that Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor
of liberal speakers in 15.4% of the cases in which they
appeared, but that conservative speakers fared substantially
better with a success rate of 64.3%.351 Consider what
happens, however, if we again remove Washington State
Grange, Lopez Torres, Milavetz, Guarnieri, Snyder, and
Williams on the grounds already stated;352 again realign the
videogame makers and sellers in Entertainment Merchants
Association with the ideological liberals;353 count Wisconsin
Right to Life only once, rather than twice, for the campaignfinance lawsuit that brought it to the Court in successive
Terms;354 and correct the authors’ mistaken finding that
Chief Justice Roberts voted in favor of the state prisoner in
Beard.355

351. See supra Table A.
352. See supra notes 345-50 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 229-44 and accompanying text.
354. See supra Part II.G.
355. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
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With those changes, the difference between Chief Justice
Roberts’s support for conservative and liberal speakers
initially does not appear to change much, with 60% support
for the former and 20% support for the latter. That difference
remains statistically significant. But we now are dealing with
such small numbers (10 cases involving conservative
speakers and 10 involving liberals) that the campaignfinance cases again loom particularly large. Just as we did
with Justice Alito, let us briefly bracket the debate about why
he voted for the speakers in the campaign-finance cases, so
that we can assess the balance of his voting history. We
would be left with a record in which he voted for conservative
speakers on 2 of 6 occasions (with neither of those two
winning sets of speakers—a seller of dog-attack videos in one
case and pharmacies and their data miners in the other—
being quintessential ideological conservatives of the sort the
authors described when explaining their coding criteria),
while voting for liberal speakers on 1 of 9. That difference is
not statistically significant. Errors and questionable
judgments aside, it is the campaign-finance cases—in which
Chief Justice Roberts treated ideologically diverse litigants
even-handedly—that account for most of the apparent
disparity in his voting record.
The evidence of Justice Alito’s and Chief Justice
Roberts’s susceptibility to in-group bias grows no stronger
when one looks at matters from the perspective of the ruleof-law principles that are at stake. Professors Epstein,
Parker, and Segal argue that the justices’ “in-group
favoritism” stands in strong tension with “the carving on the
main portico of their building promising equal justice under
law” and with “claims about the justices’ broader concern
with following and building precedent (seemingly difficult to
do when they reach dissimilar decisions in suits
differentiated only by the nature of the parties).”356
Fundamental principles about our legal system are indeed at
stake here. Are Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts
indeed reaching differing decisions in cases that are
distinguishable from one another “only by the nature of the
parties”?

356. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16 (emphasis added).
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As I have noted, both justices have been consistently
hostile to campaign-finance regulations, treating the
Democratic speaker who appeared before them just as
favorably as they treated a handful of Republicans. Once one
starts to compare the few other cases that remain in the pool,
arguably meaningful factual and legal differences begin to
abound, and the window of opportunity for confidently
charging a justice with bias narrows even further.
At the end of the day, therefore, Professors Epstein,
Parker, and Segal’s monolithic conclusions about the Court’s
currently sitting conservatives—the conclusions on which
reporters and bloggers seized most powerfully—are not well
founded. The evidence of ideological in-group bias in Justice
Alito’s chambers is arguably non-existent, while the evidence
of bias in Chief Justice Roberts’s chambers is only marginally
stronger.
IV. IN-GROUP BIAS AND MOTIVATED REASONING OFF THE
COURT
In light of the difficulties in Professors Epstein, Parker,
and Segal’s study, we find ourselves confronting an ironic
twist: working in tandem with the temptations of motivated
reasoning, the very same sort of biases that the authors
aimed to measure on the Court may have helped predispose
many writers and readers to be too quick to embrace the
study’s uniformly damning critique of the Court’s currently
sitting conservatives.
In-group biases can shape our perceptions of the justices
just as surely as in-group biases can shape the justices’
perceptions of litigants. As Jonathan Haidt has explained,
“[p]eople bind themselves into political teams that share
moral narratives. Once they accept a particular narrative,
they become blind to alternative moral worlds.”357 Among
many who self-identify as liberal, a common narrative about
the Court’s staunchest conservatives is that they are yoked
in stubborn service to an ideological agenda, shunning
357. JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY
POLITICS AND RELIGION xvi (2012); see also id. at 107-09 (providing a biographical
example of Haidt’s own experience with this worldview).

2015]

EPSTEIN-PARKER-SEGAL CRITIQUE

67

precedent and any other constraining force that
inconveniently gets in the way.358 Of course, many who selfidentify as conservative embrace a comparable narrative
about the Court’s liberals.359 Both ideological camps claim the
mantle of judicial integrity and aim to hang the millstone of
judicial activism around the necks of the other.
For many liberals, therefore, the authors’ study will
simply illustrate the truth of what they already believed:
across the board, today’s conservative justices are far less
faithful to the rule of law than their liberal counterparts. The
study’s conclusions have the added appeal of painting all of
the Court’s current conservatives with the same unflattering
brush, while finding that none of the currently sitting liberal
justices in the study manifests statistically significant
evidence of ideological in-group bias. The study thereby
provides a vocabulary with which liberals who are so inclined
can reaffirm the virtues of the justices they regard as their
own and categorically demonize the justices whom they
regard as their ideological adversaries.360 Categorical
generalizations about the Court’s conservatives are made all
the more seductive by virtue of what social-psychologists call
the out-group homogeneity effect—the tendency in many
circumstances to perceive that members of an in-group are
diverse but that members of an out-group are all the same.361
In-group bias is not the only likely reason for the study’s
easy reception in many circles; the more wide-ranging power
of motivated reasoning may play a role, as well. Whether one
finds a given item of evidence persuasive can depend to a
significant degree on whether that evidence comports or

358. That narrative will be familiar to anyone who has followed the debate
about Citizens United, Inc. v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
359. That narrative will be familiar to anyone who has followed the debate
about Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
360. Cf. HAIDT, supra note 357, at 85 (“We can believe almost anything that
supports our team.”).
361. See Mark Rubin & Constantina Badea, They’re All the Same! . . . But for
Several Different Reasons: A Review of the Multicausal Nature of Perceived Group
Variability, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 367, 368 (2012) (stating that
this is “a robust and widespread phenomenon, [but] by no means ubiquitous”).
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conflicts with beliefs to which one already is committed.362
Discomfiting though it is to confess, we are most likely to
believe what we want to believe.363 That is true both of those
who consume scholarship and of those who produce it.
Consumers of scholarship may fall prey, for example, to a
disconfirmation bias—a tendency to accept quickly and
uncritically those arguments that appear to confirm what one
already believes, and to discount arguments that cast the
truth of those beliefs in doubt.364 Researchers have found, for
example, that test subjects frequently take longer to
mentally process arguments that challenge their beliefs—not
because they are open-mindedly reconsidering their own
commitments, but because they are devoting time and
mental resources to finding fault with arguments that lead
in undesired directions.365 Adam Liptak’s opening paragraph

362. See Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:
The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2099-100 (1979) (discussing the authors’
influential study of test subjects’ evaluation of arguments concerning the death
penalty’s deterrent effect). In one study, for example, researchers found that
undergraduate and law students tended to construe the same legal precedents
differently, in keeping with their own policy preferences. See Eileen Braman &
Thomas E. Nelson, Mechanisms of Motivated Reasoning? Analogical Perception
in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 940, 954-55 (2007); cf. David A.
Hyman, Why Did Law Professors Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against
PPACA?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 824-28 (arguing that the forces of motivated
reasoning prevented many scholars from recognizing the constitutional
vulnerabilities of President Obama’s signature healthcare legislation).
363. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480,
495 (1990) (“People are more likely to arrive at those conclusions that they want
to arrive at.”).
364. See, e.g., April A. Strickland et al., Motivated Reasoning and Public
Opinion, 36 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 935, 938 (2011) (reaching this conclusion
following a study involving arguments about gun control and affirmative action);
see also Lord et al., supra note 362, at 2099 (“[I]ndividuals will dismiss and
discount empirical evidence that contradicts their initial views but will derive
support from evidence, of no greater probativeness, that seems consistent with
their views.”).
365. See, e.g., Kari Edwards & Edward E. Smith, A Disconfirmation Bias in the
Evaluation of Arguments, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (1996)
(reporting the results of a study in which test subjects were asked to assess a
variety of public-policy issues); Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, Motivated
Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 755, 761-63
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in the New York Times—a paragraph casting Justice Scalia
as one of the study’s chief villains366—may have been all that
some readers needed to hear in order to conclude that all of
the study’s findings were accurate.
Scholars too, of course, are susceptible to these sorts of
analytic pitfalls. Like everyone else, we can be too quick to
accept data that appear to support the theses we wish to
advance, and too slow to accept data that cut against us. We
also have to fend off what psychologists call a confirmation
bias—a tendency to seek out information that supports the
conclusions we wish to reach and to interpret ambiguous
information in ways favorable to those same conclusions. 367
In a study of the sort we are examining here, for example,
there is a risk that—absent precautions to prevent it—those
who are coding the data might inadvertently rely at least in
part upon particular justices’ votes when trying to determine
speakers’ ideological affiliations (e.g., presuming that if
Justice X voted against the litigant, then the litigant likely
belongs to one ideological camp rather than the other). 368
Data-coders might also inadvertently allow speakers’
ideological affiliations to reduce the care with which they try
to determine how particular justices actually voted (e.g.,
presuming that if the litigant belongs to a given ideological
camp, then Justice X likely voted against her). More
generally, if they do the coding themselves—rather than
provide a detailed written protocol to disinterested
(2006) (reporting the results of a study in which test subjects were asked to assess
arguments concerning affirmative action and gun control).
366. See Liptak, supra note 2; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text
(discussing Liptak’s coverage of the study).
367. See HAIDT, supra note 357, at 79-80 (defining “confirmation bias” as “the
tendency to seek out and interpret new evidence in ways that confirm what you
already think”); Taber & Lodge, supra note 365, at 763-64 (reporting the results
of a study in which test subjects were allowed to choose from among a variety of
differently slanted sources of information concerning affirmative action and gun
control).
368. Cf. Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 420-29 (2013)
(arguing that confirmation bias—instigated by perceptions of the Court’s
ideological leanings at the time decisions were rendered—may help to explain
curious ways in which certain data were coded for the Supreme Court Database).
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individuals and ask them to code the ideologies of the cases’
speech and speakers—those conducting a study of this sort
open themselves to the possibility of bias-laden observer
effects, in which the experimenters’ hopes and expectations
influence what they believe they are seeing.369 Of course, if
any of those were to occur, the study’s ultimate conclusions
would, in self-fulfilling fashion, overstate the evidence of ingroup bias.
CONCLUSION: LARGER LESSONS AND THE PATH AHEAD
In Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s widely
publicized study of justices’ in-group biases in First
Amendment free-expression cases, the Court’s four most
conservative members—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—come off looking by far the worst
among the justices serving on the Court today. Not
surprisingly, the conservative justices’ uniformly poor
performance provided the focal point for much of the press’s
and blogosphere’s coverage.370 Beneath the authors’
conclusions regarding those and other justices, however, one
finds a range of problems. With varying degrees of frequency,
the authors erroneously included cases having nothing to do
with free expression; ignored crucial facts about the speakers
and their First Amendment claims when appraising
speakers’ ideological identities; erroneously coded the ways
in which justices actually voted; assigned ideological
identities to speakers in the face of facts that could lead a
reasonable person to make a different judgment; disregarded
the difficulties that arise when a speaker affiliated with one
ideological camp asserts a speech claim commonly associated
with the other; included cases in which it is difficult to
imagine any justice regarding the speaker as a member of his
or her own ideological team; and, in at least one instance,
treated a speaker who appeared twice before the Court
during the course of the same litigation as if that speaker
were two different litigants. Taken together, I found one or
369. See D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-27 (2002) (providing an overview of observer
effects).
370. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 9-14 and accompanying text.
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more such difficulties in 25% of the 159 cases I reviewed,
covering all of the cases in the study from 1987 forward. One
thus has ample reason to believe that numerous additional
difficulties afflict the authors’ treatment of many of the other
cases in their study.
It is possible, of course, that although the authors’
analyses of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito were
negatively affected by coding errors and questionable
judgments, those difficulties are distributed throughout the
larger study in such a way that the authors’ bottom-line
judgments about some of the other current and former
justices would not be meaningfully affected by the problems’
correction. In early work on this Article, for example, I
started to examine whether problems corrupted the authors’
evaluation of Justice Scalia, who cast more votes than any
other currently sitting justice in the study.371 As the number
of errors and debatable classifications in those cases grew
(many of which worked to Justice Scalia’s detriment but
others to his benefit), and as my own uncertainties about how
to classify some of those speakers accumulated, I abandoned
the effort to make and defend a fine-grained assessment of
his sizable voting record, comparable to what I have offered
for Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito (the two justices
in the study with the fewest total number of votes). My sense
is that Justice Scalia might benefit from a correction of the
kinds of problems I have identified, but perhaps not to a large
degree.372 One would indeed expect that, the larger a justice’s
371. See supra Table A.
372. The authors’ treatment of Justice Scalia does, however, raise a question in
addition to those I already have discussed. Of the 92 cases in which the authors
determined that Justice Scalia encountered liberal speakers, more than one-fifth
involved speech of a sexual nature (obscenity, child pornography, nude dancing,
and the like). If the data set were adjusted to take account of the other criticisms
I have made, those sexual-speech cases might make up an even larger fraction of
the liberal-speaker cases. The authors coded the speakers in all of those sexualspeech cases as liberal, and Justice Scalia cast anti-speaker votes in almost all of
them. If all speakers who produce a given species of speech are coded as members
of one ideological group precisely because they produced that species of speech,
and if there are plausible constitutional reasons to treat that species of speech
more harshly than many others—as Justice Scalia has claimed is true of at least
some forms of sexual expression—then it is not clear how heavily one can rely
upon those cases to determine whether, across the board, a justice is “reach[ing]
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voting record, the greater the likelihood that even a sizable
number of erroneous or readily debatable coding decisions
will wash out, so long as the errors are not skewed to the
advantage or disadvantage of that justice’s ideological group.
If that is the case here, the individual justices in the authors’
study may vary greatly in the degree to which they would
benefit from a reassessment. Given the ease with which
many of the study’s problems could have been avoided, it is
unfortunate that the trustworthiness of the study’s justicespecific findings is left to depend upon such speculation by
the reader.
Some of the difficulties in the authors’ study might be
related to problems that reportedly trouble the database that
provided Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal with their
starting point.373 The publicly available Supreme Court
Database is widely used by scholars conducting empirical
analyses of the Court and of the justices’ voting patterns,374
but its contents are not beyond criticism.375 Suspicious that
the database’s coding protocols were yielding inaccurate
information about whether the outcomes of the Court’s cases
were ideologically conservative or liberal in nature, for
example, Professor Carolyn Shapiro selected ninety-five

dissimilar decisions in suits differentiated only by the nature of the parties.”
Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 16; see generally City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4,
541 U.S. 774, 787 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he pandering
of sex is not protected by the First Amendment.”); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529
U.S. 277, 310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The traditional
power of government to foster good morals (bonos mores), and the acceptability of
the traditional judgment . . . that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not
been repealed by the First Amendment.”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,
514 U.S. 334, 372 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]here is no doubt”
that laws barring obscenity do not violate the First Amendment because such
laws “existed and were universally approved in 1791”).
373. See supra note 3 (noting the authors’ use of the Supreme Court Database).
374. See Lee Epstein, Introduction: Social Science, the Courts, and the Law, 83
JUDICATURE 224, 225 (2000) (“There is little doubt that today [the] U.S. Supreme
Court Judicial Data Base is the greatest single resource of data on the Court;
there are virtually no social-scientific projects on the Court that fail to draw on
it.”).
375. I already have pointed out that quirks in the database caused irrelevant
cases to appear in the authors’ data set. See supra Part II.A.
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cases at random and recoded them herself.376 Among those
ninety-five cases, she found thirty-five—nearly 37% of the
total—whose outcomes the database simplistically coded in
binary fashion as either conservative or liberal, but for which
Professor Shapiro believed both conservative and liberal
dimensions could readily be found.377 Judge Richard Posner
has gone through a similar exercise, examining 110 randomly
selected cases in the database; he concluded that the coded
outcomes in 25% of those cases were problematic.378 In a
separate analysis of the database’s contents, Professor
Shapiro located cases whose legal issues she believed had
been misclassified, she identified problems flowing from the
coders’ reported reliance upon summaries of the cases rather
than upon the texts that the justices themselves write, and
she found instances in which coders failed to follow the
database’s own protocols.379 Professor Anna Harvey and one
of her graduate students have argued that confirmation
bias—instigated by perceptions of the Court’s ideological
leanings at the time decisions were rendered—may help to
explain curious ways in which some of the database’s
contents have been coded.380
Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal are aware of the
database’s limitations,381 and so one presumes they took steps
to ensure that those limitations did not infect their own
analysis. They did examine the information they retrieved
376. See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical
Legal Scholarship, 75 MO. L. REV. 79, 94-100 (2010) [hereinafter Shapiro, Context
of Ideology]. For a description of the protocol that the coders for the Supreme
Court Database use when determining whether the outcome of a case is
conservative or liberal, see Online Code Book: Decision Direction, supra note 48.
377. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 100.
378. EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 8, at 105, 150.
379. See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical
Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 494-500 (2009) [hereinafter
Shapiro, Coding Complexity].
380. See Harvey & Woodruff, supra note 368, at 420-29; see also supra notes
367-69 and accompanying text (discussing confirmation bias).
381. See EPSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES, supra note 8, at 105
(discussing some of Professor Shapiro’s criticisms of the Supreme Court
Database); id. at 150 (discussing Judge Posner’s test of the database’s ideological
classifications).
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from the database before putting those data to work,
explaining, for example, that “[t]o ensure consistency with
our First Amendment concerns, we rechecked the coding of
all votes and made alterations as necessary.”382 Numerous
problems nevertheless appear in their study, leaving one to
speculate about those problems’ origins. The kinds of
difficulties that Professor Shapiro identified in the Supreme
Court Database—misclassified cases, overly simplistic
designations of phenomena as conservative or liberal, coding
cases without carefully attending to the texts of the cases
themselves, failing to apply a consistent set of coding
standards to ensure that like cases are treated alike—all
bear a resemblance to the sorts of problems one encounters
in Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal’s study. Moreover,
the rate at which I found difficulties in the authors’
treatment of individual cases approximates the rate at which
Judge Posner found problems in the database. If there is
indeed a causal relationship here, Professor Shapiro’s
warning bears revisiting: “Put bluntly, rather than
illuminate the workings of the Supreme Court, some
empirical findings may reflect the way the Database reports
(or, in the language of empirical analysis, ‘codes’)
information—or whether it reports certain types of
information at all.”383
If there is not, in fact, a direct causal relationship
between the limitations of the Supreme Court Database and
the problems in this study—that is, if researchers are
independently producing data with the same sorts of
shortcomings—then it probably is time to take a second look
at the data-handling norms that generally prevail among
those who gather and report data of this sort. As I noted when
discussing the authors’ mishandling of numerous cases,384 for
example, it appears that Professors Epstein, Parker, and
Segal opted not to consider all of the relevant and readily
available facts in (at least some of) the cases whose speakers
and speech they were classifying, apparently choosing to rely
instead upon case captions or superficial case summaries. As
382. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 8.
383. Shapiro, Coding Complexity, supra note 379, at 480.
384. See supra Parts I.C, II.
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Professor Shapiro pointed out in her criticism of the Supreme
Court Database’s coders on similar grounds,385 failing to
attend to the justices’ written opinions can lead to problems.
Relatedly, the study’s authors appear to have paid little (if
any) attention to the information contained in the briefs and
other litigation documents for the cases they were coding, or
to the identities and ideological affiliations of amici curiae,
all of which (like the texts of the justices’ decisions) can
provide information that is relevant to the task that the
authors set for themselves—namely, trying to ascertain how
the justices themselves likely appraised the ideological
affiliations of speakers and their speech.
Some of the study’s problems may also be the result of
the authors’ decision not to provide readers with a detailed
description of the criteria they used when classifying
speakers’ and speech’s ideologies.386 That surprising choice
may have something to do with my inability to reproduce
their assessments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.
Yet even if they had provided a full description of their coding
criteria, it seems clear that those criteria sometimes
produced measures whose validity can readily be
challenged.387 As I noted, for example, in earlier versions of
their paper the authors revealed that they regarded “racist
communication” and “racist behavior” as things that qualify
a speaker for membership in conservative justices’ ideological
in-group.388 In their short description of conservative
speakers in the most recent version of their paper, they have
replaced racists with pro-life advocates but have not
disavowed their earlier treatment of racist expression.389 In
my own judgment, the authors’ linkage between racism and
conservative justices’ ideological in-group is quite stunning.
It is one thing to believe (as many conservatives do), for
example, that race-based affirmative action violates the
Equal Protection Clause; it is quite another to associate with
385. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Parts I.C, II.
388. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
389. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10.
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the Aryan Brotherhood, or to identify with a man who attacks
a young boy because he is white, or to feel an ideological
affinity with one who burns a cross in the yard of an AfricanAmerican family.390
Looking ahead, the authors urge other researchers to join
the search for in-group biases among judges and justices,
both within the free-expression realm and beyond.391 That is
a good proposal. As Professors Epstein, Parker, and Segal
write, “the rule of law requires judges to dispense justice
without regard to the parties,”392 and prior, smaller studies
(and perhaps even elements of this larger study) suggest that
in-group biases do sometimes play a role in the way that
courts adjudicate the disputes that come before them.393 The
public is well served by information about how all of its
branches of government are performing, and that certainly is
no less true of the judiciary than it is of the political branches.
Needless to say, however, the public is well served by
information that can readily withstand reasonable criticism
but ill-served by information that cannot.394 With the justices
now reportedly voting along partisan lines to an
unprecedented degree,395 the Court already invites cynicism
390. See supra notes 188-96 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving
those facts).
391. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 3, 16.
392. Id. at 16.
393. See, e.g., David S. Abrams et al., Do Judges Vary in Their Treatment of
Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 374 (2012) (reporting that, in a study of state cases
adjudicated in Cook County, Illinois, the gap between the lengths of sentences
that white defendants and racial-minority defendants received was significantly
reduced when the sentences were imposed by African-American judges); Moses
Shayo & Asaf Zussman, Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism, 126
Q. J. ECON. 1447, 1448-49 (2011) (reporting that, in a study of small-claims courts
in Israel, Arab and Jewish judges tend to favor litigants who are members of their
own ethnic groups, particularly when there is terroristic activity geographically
and temporally close to the rulings).
394. Cf. Epstein & King, supra note 38, at 9 (“[R]egardless of the purpose, effect,
or intended audience of the research, academics have an obligation to produce
work that is reliable.”).
395. See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party
Polarization Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court 1 (William & Mary
Law School, Research Paper No. 09-276), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2432111. It bears noting that these authors, too, relied
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among the larger public. As Adam Liptak noted in the New
York Times several days after covering Professors Epstein,
Parker, and Segal’s study, “[t]he perception that partisan
politics has infected the court’s work may do lasting damage
to its prestige and authority and to Americans’ faith in the
rule of law.”396 The gravity of that risk makes it all the more
important for those who study the Court to ensure that, when
reporting findings that play squarely into the hands of those
who are eager to dismiss a politically identifiable block of
justices as opportunistic ideologues, those findings are as
unimpeachable as one can reasonably make them.397
The trickiest problem for future studies of justices’
ideological in-group biases is determining how to assign
ideological identities to litigants in a manner that leaves one
reasonably confident that the identities one assigns
correspond to the identities that the justices perceived. After
all, if a justice does not regard a litigant as a member of an
ideological in-group or out-group, then the groundwork for
manifesting an in-group bias has not been laid.398 Professors
Epstein, Parker, and Segal got it exactly right when they
wrote that “the two key inputs in [their] study” were “[t]he
ideology of the Justices and the speakers.”399 Assigning
ideological identities to the justices themselves is not as
upon the Supreme Court Database and its coding of justices’ votes as conservative
or liberal. See id. at 7 & n.21. As I have explained, that reliance evidently comes
with significant baggage. See supra notes 373-80 and accompanying text.
396. Adam Liptak, The Polarized Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2014, at
SR6.
397. Cf. Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 85 (“If we want to talk
about whether we think the Justices get the balance between law and ideology
right, then we have to know what balance they are in fact striking, when they
allow ideology to dominate, and how other factors influence their decisions.”)
(emphasis added). The risk I describe above is made even more acute by the fact
that ideologically driven us-versus-them thinking appears to be on the rise as a
general matter. See Political Polarization in the American Public, PEW RES. CTR.
FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS (June 12, 2014), http://www.peoplepress.org/2014/06/12/political-polarization-in-the-american-public (“Republicans
and Democrats are more divided along ideological lines—and partisan antipathy
is deeper and more extensive—than at any point in the last two decades.”).
398. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
399. Summary, supra note 6, at 2.
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difficult today as it once might have been: the Segal-Cover
scores on which the study’s authors relied provide a plausible
basis for carrying out that task.400 But researchers evidently
have not yet developed a comparably defensible basis for
assigning ideological identities to litigants when those
identities are not already clear. I am skeptical about whether
it can be satisfactorily done, but the task’s ultimate
feasibility is for those who carry out these studies to
determine in the first instance.401
The authors’ explanation of how they determined
speakers’ ideological affiliations—saying that anti-gay and
pro-life speakers were classified as conservative, “students
espousing liberal causes, war protestors burning American
flags, [and] donors providing support to or associating with
left-wing organizations” were classified as liberal, “and so
on”402—relies upon obvious examples and deflects readers’
attention from the frequent difficulty of the task. Moreover,
the authors’ apparent (but unelaborated) partial reliance
upon the Supreme Court Database’s coding protocols
evidently does not suffice to yield a high rate of
uncontroversial results. As I have illustrated, there are many
litigants to whom the study’s authors assigned ideological
identities that are either wrong or reasonably debatable.403 So
long as those identities remain open to question, one cannot
be confident that one knows how those litigants were
perceived by the justices themselves. Until those who study
ideological in-group bias develop a means of surmounting
400. See supra note 8.
401. I would imagine that the ideal method would shun classifying litigants in
binary fashion as either conservative or liberal, but instead would place litigants
on a spectrum that is sensitive to degrees of ideological tilt. For examples of
researchers’ efforts to find nuanced ways to measure ideology-laden phenomena
in other legal settings, see Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of
Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. 1, passim
(2009) (developing ways to measure case outcomes that are more nuanced than
simply classifying those outcomes in binary fashion as either “liberal” or
“conservative”); Shapiro, Context of Ideology, supra note 376, at 129-33
(suggesting means by which to measure a case’s “ideological salience” for the
justices).
402. Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 10.
403. See supra Parts I.C, II.
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that difficulty, researchers are presented with a choice: they
can either reduce the size of their data pools, retaining only
those cases in which litigants’ ideological identities are clear,
or produce studies that might unjustifiably inflame those
whose own in-group biases predispose them to embrace the
results. The former seems the better path; the fires of
cynicism and partisanship already burn well enough on their
own.
* * * * * *
On September 30, 2014, shortly after I posted an earlier
version of this Article on SSRN, Professors Epstein, Parker,
and Segal posted a brief reply, conceding a handful of errors
but otherwise declining to budge.404 I have noted instances in
which the authors’ explanations of their coding decisions
unfortunately make it even clearer that they misunderstood
the facts of some of the cases they were coding.405 There are
larger points about the authors’ response, however, that may
usefully be made. First, at least at the time of this writing
(October 2014), one will search their response materials in
vain for a comprehensive list of their coding criteria. That
strangely enduring lacuna is difficult to explain on terms
favorable to the study, particularly given the insistence in
2002 of the study’s lead author—in the context of sharply
criticizing other scholars’ work—that the public presentation
of such a list is an indispensable feature of good empirical
scholarship.406 It is clear that the Supreme Court Database’s
coding criteria provided the authors with their start, but it
also is clear that they supplemented those criteria with
judgments of their own.
Second, recall that the authors erroneously included at
least three cases that had nothing to do with First
Amendment expressive freedoms—the area of law in which
the authors said they were assessing the justices’ tendencies
toward ideological in-group bias.407 The authors tersely
404. See Lee Epstein et al., A Response to a Critique of Our Study on In-Group
Bias (Sept. 30, 2014), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/InGroupBiasResponse.
pdf [hereinafter Response].
405. See, e.g., supra notes 132-42, 245-49 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
407. See supra Part II.A.
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dismissed that criticism, and in the process they revealed an
orientation that goes a long way toward explaining some of
the study’s other weaknesses. Here is what they wrote:
[H]e asserts that three cases shouldn’t be in our study because he
doesn’t think they implicate freedom of expression. What he thinks,
though, wasn’t our definition for inclusion. We selected cases based
on the Supreme Court Database’s issue area definitions. Now the
author might not like these definitions. That’s fine; he’s free to
write his own and then go through all the Supreme Court’s
decisions since 1953 to determine the cases that do and do not meet
his new definition. But he’s not free to condemn our work for failing
to meet his self-imposed definition (whatever it might be).408

Even apart from the angry bluster, that is a discouraging
but telling response. I would have thought that a case merits
inclusion in a study purporting to focus entirely on First
Amendment expressive freedoms only if that case concerns
First Amendment expressive freedoms. My definition was no
more “new” or “self-imposed” than that; indeed, it is identical
to the definition that the authors themselves explicitly
provided when they wrote that “[h]ere and throughout the
paper, we focus exclusively on the First Amendment
guarantees of speech, press, assembly, and association.”409
Anyone who reads those three cases will see that they had
nothing to do with First Amendment claims of speech, press,
assembly, association, or petition. Yet in the authors’
judgment, we are to ignore that fact because the Supreme
Court Database told the authors that those cases were
relevant to their study. At some point, obeisance to the
Supreme Court Database must reach its limits, giving way to
what those who take the time to read the Court’s cases can
unambiguously see for themselves. In the meantime, there is
nothing impertinent about pointing out ways in which
researchers have misapprehended the facts.
There are more important things at stake here than
merely the coding of those three cases. The orientation that
the authors have now made explicit bears upon other
problems in their study. Was the goal here to study in-group
bias in First Amendment free-expression cases, based upon
one’s best effort to identify the justices’ own in-group and out408. Epstein et al., Response, supra note 404, at 1.
409. See Epstein et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.6 (emphasis added).
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group assessments of the free-expression claimants who
appeared before them, or was it instead to see what the
Supreme Court Database would say when asked a question?
If agreement is elusive on that seemingly fundamental point,
then there is little reason to be optimistic about reaching
agreement on more subtle but nevertheless similarly
important matters, such as the degree to which the authors’
coding criteria—some of which remain undisclosed—can be
trusted to accurately capture the justices’ own in-group and
out-group assessments of ideologically nuanced cases.
The issue for future researchers in the area of in-group
bias is whether the authors’ design, execution, presentation,
and defense of this particular study are worthy of close
emulation. The public deserves a thoughtful answer to that
question.
APPENDIX
I reviewed the authors’ treatment of all cases decided
between 1987 and the close of their study’s time period,
amounting to 30% of the more than 500 cases they included.
In that review, I examined the authors’ ideological
classifications of those cases’ First Amendment claimants
and the authors’ coding of Chief Justice Roberts’s, Justice
Scalia’s, and Justice Alito’s votes. Of the 159 cases I
reviewed, I found one or more errors or readily debatable
judgments in 40 cases, or in 25% of those I examined.
The following table lists in chronological order the cases
in which I found problems. In the right-hand column, an “A”
signifies that the case had nothing to do with the freedom of
expression; a “B” signifies that the authors miscoded the vote
of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, and/or Justice Scalia;
a “C” indicates that the authors likely erred when assigning
an ideological classification to the case; a “D” indicates cases
in which, even if one cannot confidently say that the authors
erred, one can easily question whether the authors’
ideological classifications accurately captured how the
justices themselves assessed the First Amendment
claimants’ ideological in-group or out-group status; an “E”
denotes cases in which it is difficult to imagine any justice
regarding the speakers as members of his or her own
ideological in-group; and an “F” signifies that the authors
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double-counted a speaker who appeared twice before the
Court during the course of the same litigation.
1

Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)

D

2

Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)

B

3

S.F. Arts & Athletics v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522 (1987)

C

4

Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988)

A

5

Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988)

A

6

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)

D

7

Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93 (1988)

A

8

Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989)

C

9

City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989)

D

10

Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989)

D

11

Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990)

D

12

Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n,
496 U.S. 91 (1990)

D

13

Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)

C

14

Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991)

D

15

Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992)

D; E

16

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992)

C

17

R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)

D; E

18

Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)

D; E

19

United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993)

D

20

Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation,
512 U.S. 136 (1994)

D

21

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994)

B

22

United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union,
513 U.S. 454 (1995)

C

23

Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)

B

24

Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186 (1996)

C

25

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996)

C

26

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998)

C

27

L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp.,
528 U.S. 32 (1999)

D

28

Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000)

C

29

Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000)

C
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30

Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
535 U.S. 150 (2002)

D

31

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)

D; E

32

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006), and FEC v.
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007)

F

33

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006)

B

34

N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008)

C or
D*

35

Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party,
552 U.S. 442 (2008)

B; C
or D*

36

United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008)

E

37

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States,
559 U.S. 229 (2010)

D

38

Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011)

E

39

Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011)

B, D

40

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011)

D

* In the two cases marked with both a C and a D, I argue that the authors
either erred by assigning a single ideological identity to a coalition of ideologically
diverse speakers, erred by assigning an ideological classification to speech in the
absence of a persuasive reason to believe that the justices themselves placed that
speech in one ideological category rather than the other, or made an undefended
assumption that, for a justice driven by ideological in-group bias, the ideological
tenor of the speech matters more than the usual ideological affiliation of the
speaker. For more, see supra Parts I.C, II.C, II.E.

